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Over the past twenty-five years, much discussion of selfhood in autobiography 
has centered on gender relations. After the early domination of male scholars of 
autobiography headed by Georges Gusdorf，feminists such as Mary Mason and Joy 
Hooton, have discussed self along, in Paul John Eakin's term, "an axis of gender" 
(Eakin, 51). Despite objecting to conventional views on selfhood by earlier male 
� scholars of autobiography, feminists have actually built up and strengthened the 
"myth of autonomous individualism" (Eakin, 51) by presenting selfhood in women's 
autobiography as relational as opposed to the autonomous self in men's autobiography. 
However, psychologist Jessica Benjamin argues that all self is relational rather than 
autonomous. In How Our Lives Become Stories (1999)，Eakin also argues that “all 
identity is relational" (43) as a departure from feminists' binary argument that male 
self is autonomous whereas female self is relational. Setting off from his point, I will 
review some theories and then argue that selfhood in J. M. Coetzee's two 
autobiographies Boyhood and Youth is relational by referring to Jessica Benjamin, 
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In How Our Lives Become Stories (1999)，Paul John Eakin questions 
conventional theories on studying selfhood in autobiography by asking "Why do we 
so easily forget that the first person of autobiography is truly plural in its origins and 
subsequent formation?" (43) He goes on to point out his view that the assumption of 
autobiography, which means to tell a story of oneself, "promotes an illusion of self-
determination" (43). The earliest discussion of selfhood in autobiography became a 
discussion of autonomy. Autobiography experts tended to be fascinated by the 
autonomous aspect of autobiography ignoring the fact that the self is also "defined 
by—and lives in terms of—its relations to others" (Eakin, 43). 
According to Eakin, “all identity is relational" (43). I agree with Eakin and 
adopt his viewpoint to analyze Coetzee's two autobiographies. Before that I am going 
to review the controversy on selfhood from Georges Gusdorf, one of the earliest 
theorists of autobiography. 
I would like to divide discussion on selfhood of autobiography into three 
phases. From the 1950s to the 1980s, the first phase in autobiography criticism, 
headed by Georges Gusdorf, Philippe Lejeime and James Olney, sees selfhood as a 
manifestation of individual autonomy. 
Such a view is challenged in the late 1980s by feminists such as Susan 
Stanford Friedman, Joy Hooton，Felicity Nussbaum and Mary Mason, who regard 
autonomous selfhood as a product of male reading and propose an idea that female 
selfhood is relational. Eakin and Nancy K. Miller, coming in the third phase in the late 
1990s, present the self in autobiography as relational, regardless of gender. 
2 
First Phase 
In 1956，Georges Gusdorf first gives a deep investigation of autobiography in 
"Conditions and Limits of Autobiography," later translated by James Olney into 
English. According to Gusdorf, autobiography "expresses a concern peculiar to 
Western man, a concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the 
universe and that he has communicated to men of other cultures" (29). Despite the 
fact that Gusdorf thinks autobiography is to express a "concern" in order to 
� 
"communicate", the communication, if it exists, is just one-way. The one who wants 
« to express his concern through autobiography and the one who receives the 
autobiographer's concern do not stand on equal footing. On the nature of selfhood in 
autobiography, Gusdorf writes: 
Each of us tends to think of himself as the center of a living space: I count, 
my existence is significant to the world, and my death will leave the world 
incomplete. In narrating my life, I give witness of myself even from 
beyond my death and so can preserve this precious capital that ought not 
disappear. The author of an autobiography gives a sort of relief to his 
image by reference to the environment with its independent existence; he 
looks at himself being and delights in being looked a t~he calls himself as 
witness for himself; others he calls as witness for what is irreplaceable in 
his presence (29). 
Gusdorf thinks that autobiography is a manifestation of the centreness of self. The 
relation between the world and the self is perceived from the self s reference point. 
When the self projects his view onto the world, his "existence" becomes "significant" 
to the world. The significance of his existence does not require the world to recognize 
him. The self is in this sense, self-centered. The self departs from the centre and 
3 
radiates to the world by expressing his "concern through autobiography". Therefore, 
autobiography is a means which connects the self and the world and by which the self 
achieves the significance of his existence. Such existence is "independent" (29). The 
self, on the one hand, gains his significant existence in reference to the world; on the 
other hand, it is independent from the world. The self separates himself and gains 
independence as soon as he "witness[es]" himself. He is sufficient in his oneness. In 
this sense, Gusdorfs definition is individualistic. 
Gusdorf thinks that the individual self in autobiography comes from a 
» "conscious awareness of the singularity of each individual life" (29). He regards the 
individual self as a "late product of a specific civilization" (29). Human history exists 
before the individual self. The individual does not "feel himself to exist outside of 
others" (29). It is in this sense that the individual's existence is interdependent. But 
Gusdorf thinks that the interdependent self is history since the individual self in 
autobiography is consciously aware of his "singularity". Although, to Gusdorf，the 
self is universal as "each of us" seems to see ourselves as the centre of the world, he 
paradoxically acknowledges that "autobiography is not possible in a cultural 
landscape where consciousness of self does not, properly speaking, exist" (30). By 
implication, the Gusdorfian self can only exist under certain conditions. Therefore, it 
cannot be universal. 
Gusdorf goes on to throw out more and more conditions on the making of the 
self. He thinks autobiography appears "only under certain metaphysical 
preconditions" (30). When a man walks out of the "mythic framework of traditional 
teachings", enters into "the perilous domain of history" and discovers that "the 
present differs from the past and that it will not be repeated in the future", he will find 
it “a useful and valuable thing to fix his own image so that he can be certain it will not 
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disappear like all things in the world" (30). Autobiography comes into existence. The 
motive for the man to write his autobiography is to leave "his own image" in this 
world. The motive for him to write an autobiography is to assure the existence and 
significance of his self, which is individualistic and self-sufficient. 
Gusdorf gives a self-centered account for writing autobiography. He points out 
that a man's wish to leave his view in history makes autobiography come into 
existence. When a man knows that he is “a responsible agent: gatherer of men, of 
lands, of power, maker of kingdoms or of empires, inventor of laws or of wisdom" 
9 (31) and that "he alone adds consciousness to nature, leaving there the sign of his 
presence" (31), the "historic personage" appears in the form of biography, which 
“alongside with monuments, inscriptions, statues, is one manifestation of his desire to 
endure in men's memory" (31). 
Gusdorf s definition on the self in autobiography makes up a self-sufficient 
picture of leaders, emperors and history. He puts biography into the same category as 
"monuments, inscriptions, statues" (31). All of them serve a manifestation purpose; 
they are to extract and record some events or moments in history. And the 
"personage" is the centre of the manifestation. For example, a statue is the record of a 
hero but not the texture of bronze or marble. When a "personage" is recorded with 
words, autobiography appears. Therefore, "autobiography is the mirror in which the 
individual reflects his own image. • •，，(3). 
After assuring us that the self in autobiography is closely connected to history, 
Gusdorf goes straight to discuss the internal operation of autobiography. He thinks 
that in autobiography, it is the author's job to narrate "his own history" (35). The 
author appears as a historian to “reassemble the scattered elements of his individual 
life and to regroup them in a comprehensive sketch" (35). Therefore, echoing the 
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mirroring characteristic, autobiography exists as a "portrait" (35) of the author. By 
"portrait" Gusdorf does not mean "the moment of external appearance" that a painter 
captures but "a complete and coherent expression" of the author's "entire destiny" 
(35). The self is constant and unique. It works in a process which entails a start and a 
destination. The "entire destiny" in autobiography, therefore, perfects itself when the 
self finishes the journey of his growth. It is this "special unity and identity across 
time" (35) that an autobiographer needs to focus on in reconstituting himself. The self 
� 
begins with attachment and through separation reaches autonomy. 
•» Moving on with his Odysseyan-like view on life as a journey, Gusdorf clearly 
points out that autobiography is "devoted exclusively to the defence and glorification 
of a man, a career, a political cause, or a skillful strategy" (36) and that autobiography 
is “limited almost entirely to the public sector of existence" (36). The individualistic 
and autonomous self in autobiography does not lock himself up at home but manifests 
himself to the public. The self belongs to the public domain. 
As the self takes himself as the focus, naturally he will recount his history 
from his point of view. The author of autobiography finds his "individual unity" (38) 
and “the mysterious essence" (38) of his present being by looking back onto his past. 
Following “the law of gathering in and of understanding in all the acts" that have been 
his, the self recognizes “all the faces and all the places" (38) that have made up his 
destiny and thus asserts his unity and existence. 
Life, therefore, to Gusdorf, is a search for the self. A man searches for "his 
self through his history" (39). He is the one in pursuit of his "personal justification" 
(39). Therefore, "the task of autobiography is first of all a task of personal salvation" 
(39). Individuality, autonomy and unity resonate throughout Gusdorf s theory on the 
self in autobiography. 
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Second Phase 
Gusdorfs view on the autonomous self as a universal phenomenon meets its 
challenges in the late 1980s when feminists present the idea of the female self. In the 
essay "The Other Voices: Autobiographies of Women Writers." Mary G. Mason finds 
the Gusdorfs theory on the self "inappropriate as a model for women's life-writing" 
(210) as it "does not accord with the deepest realities of women's experience" (210). 
She discovers a "dramatic structure of conversion" (210) in Augustine's Confessions, 
� 
in which "the self is presented as the stage for a battle of opposing forces and where a 
» climactic victory for one force—spirit defeating f leshcompletes the drama of the 
self (210). She sees Rousseau's Confessions as another example which presents the 
"egoistic secular archetype" and "Romantic brethren" (210). According to Mason, 
Rousseau's Confessions differs from Augustine's Confessions only by "shifting the 
dramatic presentation to an unfolding self-discovery" (210). Although Rousseau tells 
of people and events in his life, they serve simply as "aspects of the author's evolving 
consciousness" (210). In other words, the self in Rousseau's Confessions still 
positions himself as the centre of life; it is he who gives meaning to the characters and 
events in his life. Mason points out that such a self “finds no echo in women's writing 
about their lives" (210). Gusdorfs discussion on the self is autonomous which only 
applies to men's writing. The self in women's writing is different. 
Susan Stanford Friedman has the same disagreement with Gusdorf on the 
discussion of the self. In the essay "Women's Autobiographical Selves." (1988)， 
Friedman points out that Gusdorfs “model of separate and unique selfhood that is 
highlighted in his work and shared by many other critics establishes a critical bias that 
leads to the (mis)leading and marginalization of autobiographical texts by women and 
minorities’，(34). By putting women's and minorities' writing to the margin, Gusdorf 
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successfully formulates canons of autobiography. According to Friedman, Gusdorfs 
"emphasis on individualism does not take into account the importance of a culturally 
imposed group identity for women and minorities" and that on "separateness ignores 
the differences in socialization in the construction of male and female gender identity" 
(34). 
Apart from attacking the individualism and separateness of the Gusdorfian self, 
Friedman notes that Gusdorf "associates 'presence' and self-consciousness with the 
rise of the European empires and the related phenomenon of the Industrial Revolution, 
» with its constitution of highly polarized public and private spheres" (35). She objects 
to Gusdorfs view that autobiography is “the literary consequence of the rise of 
individualism as an ideology" (35). 
Instead of relating it to history as a product of civilization, Friedman goes to 
psychoanalysis to investigate the relation between socialization and the formation of 
self which she takes as a gender issue. Friedman points out that "psychoanalysis 
focuses on the development of the self as it forms through intense interaction with 
others, particularly the mother and father" (36). Based on Nancy Chodorow, Friedman 
thinks that the self has different manifestations in men's and women's writing. 
Chodorow writes, in Femininities, Masculinities, Sexualities (1994)，that "[w]omen 
seek directly to reconstitute, resurrect, reshape, reimagine an emotional relation with 
their mothers; they fantasize and unconsciously experience internal and actual 
mothers even as they form relationships with men" (82). Friedman adopts 
Chodorow's view to argue that when the author of autobiography looks back onto his 
earlier past, rather than embarking on a quest of autonomy, as Gusdorf suggests, s/he 
comes to an understanding of his/her “self-creation” (36) by exploring or 
recapitulating his/her "past interplay with his or her parents" (36). 
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Friedman's feminist view attempts to refute Gusdorfs view of the 
autonomous self as a universal phenomenon. Chodorow's view on female 
relationality gives psychological evidence to Friedman's model. In Feminism and 
Psychoanalytic Theory (1989)，Chodorow writes: 
The care and socialization of girls by women ensure the production of . 
feminine personalities founded on relation and connection, with flexible 
rather than rigid ego boundaries, and with a comparatively secure sense of 
gender identity. This is one explanation for how women's relative 
embeddedness is reproduced from generation to generation, and why it 
exists within almost every society (57). 
However, Friedman finds classical models of psychology on the self in autobiography 
"fundamentally individualistic because the healthy ego is defined in terms of its 
ability to separate itself from others" (36). She points out that Gusdorf s “[i]solate 
individualism is an illusion. It is also the privilege of power" (36) because a white 
man is privileged to forget that his skin is white and he is a male. Therefore, he can 
"think of himself as an 'individual'" (36). Women and minorities do not have this 
privilege because they are "reminded at every turn in the great cultural hall of mirrors 
of their sex or color, have no such luxury" (36). 
Friedman argues that Gusdorf s "emphasis on individualism as the necessary 
precondition for autobiography is thus a reflection of privilege" (39). Writers who are 
excluded from the canons of autobiography "have been denied by history" (39). 
Individualism is just an “illusion’，（39) presented from a male perspective. Unlike 
men's individualism, women's identity is, to Friedman, "collective". This "sense of 
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collective identity, however, is not only negative" but also "a source of strength and 
transformation" (39). 
Arguing from the distinction between the male and the female self, Joy 
Hooton criticizes Gusdorf as well as Olney for not mentioning female autobiography 
in their discussion of the self in autobiography. In Stories of Herself When Young 
(1990)，Hooton points out that: 
On the one hand critics have seized on the modernist implications of 
� 
autobiography as self-reflexive, self-enacting discourse; on the other, they 
«. have virtually ignored the equally challenging potential of feminist theory. 
If the criticism of autobiography is pre-eminently concerned with 
ideologies of selfhood, it must also be concerned with ideologies of gender, 
yet autobiographical theory has consistently turned a blind eye to the 
relationship. Both Gusdorf and Olney fail to mention a single female 
autobiography; Hart includes mention of one... (80). 
She goes on to attack individualism as a product of male critics' patriarchal view on 
autobiography. She argues, for examples, that Avrom Fleishman's six approaches in 
Figures of Autobiography (1983) "reveal[ ] a common basis underlying their apparent 
variety, that is, the assumption that autobiography is grounded in individualism and in 
individualism of a certain kind" (83). The individual's "subjectivity", "singularity" 
and "sense of difference" (83) preoccupy Gusdorf s discussion of the self. 
The individual's subjectivity in “male autobiographical discourse" (83) 
manifests itself through "I", which is, in Sidonie Smith's term, 'the imperialistic 
designs of a speaking subject intent on "naming, controlling, remembering, 
understanding'" (Smith, Poetics, 8). By projecting his self onto the world, the "male 
autobiographer, according to his commentators, is concerned with the enchanting 
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pursuit of the elusive first person singular, with making a coherent system out of his 
life" (83). 
Hooton also objects to Gusdorf s view that autobiography is “limited almost 
entirely to the public sector of existence" (Gusdorf, 36). Hooton argues: 
The value of an autobiography depends on its creation of an impression of 
its 'driving force.. .what Montaigne calls a man's “master form'". Truth in 
autobiography is not objective truth but truth that ‘grows out of the 
� 
author's life and imposes itself on him as his specific quality'. Since the 
-» primary purpose of autobiography is not to show us the private individual 
behind the public man but 'the man within the work，，the most interesting 
autobiographies are necessarily those men who have led interesting public 
lives. (Hooton, 84) 
Other than pointing out Gusdorfs excluding women's autobiography, Hooton 
investigates the biased criterion in judging autobiography. Discussion on the self in 
autobiography is a “male autobiographical discourse" (83) in which women's writing 
is marginalized not only in terms of number but also in the nature of the self. Male 
critics build up a male discourse on autobiography by getting rid of women's writing 
as well as universalizing the nature of the self which is only appropriate to men. By 
doing so, "the concepts of singularity, autonomy, teleological design, unity, 
appropriation and achieved rhetorical ends are privileged" (84). Such a male 
ideological discourse creates an attitude in perceiving valuable texts as those which 
present a self-conscious awareness of "the process of self-discovery and comment on 
the transforming power of the existential journey" (84). 
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To oppose and deconstruct the "male autobiographical discourse", Hooton 
presents a view that the female self is relational. Hooton discovers a distinct 
difference in the selves in men's and women's autobiographies: 
Factual female autobiographies also emphasize attachment and continuity, 
while breakdown in relationships is a cause for suffering; if the male hero 
fears connection, the female hero fears separation. Some narratives describe 
the failure of relationships as threatening the self s survival (93). 
� 
Hooton presents a binary picture of the self in autobiography. She draws evidence 
’ f r o m the psychologist Jean Baker Miller. In Towards a New Psychology of 
Women{\9^6\ Miller shows that to build up connections with others is essential in the 
self of women. She writes: 
One central feature is that women stay with, build on, and develop in a 
context of connections with others. Indeed, women's sense of self becomes 
very much organized around being able to make and then to maintain 
affiliations and relationships. Eventually, for many women the threat of 
disruption of connection is perceived not as just a loss of a relationship but 
as something closer to a total loss of self (Miller, 83). 
She regards that in human history, "women's lives have been so totally focused on 
others" and thus concludes that "such questions bear a special cogency and come 
from a particularly hidden place in women" (97). In other words, affiliation to others 
is a significant part which makes up and sustains the female self. 
Drawing psychological evidence from Miller, Hooton argues that the female self is 
relational. Women's autobiographies should present relationality. However, women 
have not developed "the ecriture feminine，，(102) originating from French feminists 
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such as Helene Cixous. To Hooton, autobiography still belongs to the realm of men 
since it focuses on the "self whereas "memoir", on "others". By implication, she sees 
women's writing as a form of protest against male autobiographical discourse. 
Echoing Hooton, Felicity Nussbaum presents the idea that the self in men's 
autobiography is autonomous whereas that in women's, relational. In The 
Autobiographical Subject (1989)，Nussbaum, as a materialist feminist, is skeptical 
about the authenticity of autobiography. Instead, she is interested in investigating 
“what constitutes autobiographical writing in the period and why, when readers 
w consumed multiple editions of Grace Abounding, literary historians have found no 
landmark canonical texts before the time of Rousseau in France, Franklin in America, 
and Boswell and Gibbon in England" (Intro, xi). According to Nussbaum, canons of 
autobiography are products of，in Hooton，s terms, "a male autobiographical 
discourse". Nussbaum points out that the "self in autobiography is "held in place by 
class and gender relations" (xi). By implication, the "self , to Nussbaum, is not 
universal as the Gusdorfian model goes but historical as well as class-gender specific. 
Objecting to Gusdorf s universal self, Nussbaum puts the "self in quotations to 
indicate that the "self is "an ideological construct that is recruited into place within 
specific historical formations rather than always present as an eternal truth" (xii). 
Moving on, she points out that male critics put too much "insistence on 'I: as a 
primary mode of perceiving" (xii). Such an assumption "governs the genre in the 
eighteenth century" (xii) and creates "autobiography" as a genre in which the "self is 
the focus of discussion. Therefore, the "ideology of genre makes it possible to assume 
a unified and authoritative narrative position of an T who holds the discrete 
particulars together" (xii). 
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Like Hooton, Nussbaum argues that "women's autobiographical writing, 
organized within prevailing discourses" helps "shape and resist the dominant cultural 
constructions of gender relations and to substitute alternatives" (xiv). She asserts that 
the self in women's autobiographical writing is relational by criticizing the 
individualism of the self in autobiography defined by Philippe Lejeune. In Le Facte 
Autobiographique (1989)，Lejeune defines autobiography as "a retrospective prose 
narrative produced by a real person concerning his own existence, focusing on his 
individual life, in particular on the development of his personality" (Lejeune, 4). 
® Nussbaum thinks that Lejeime's definition implies "assumptions of an individuality 
that is distinct from collective humankind; of the existence of an essence, a 
personality, which unfolds in the narrative of the past; and of the irrelevance of 
women's life-writing" (Nussbaum, 4). Nussbaum further asserts different realizations 
of the self in men's and women's autobiographical writing. 
Thinking along gender lines, Francoise Lionnet, in Autobiographical Voices 
(1989)，explores the self in autobiography as other feminists do. Although she tries to 
reject "the whole Western tradition of binary thinking which contributes to the 
naturalization of such distinctions as male/female, master/slave, 
autonomous/dependent, writer/reader" (68)，she still acknowledges a binary 
distinction between male and female selves. Yet she presents an idea of 
"interconnectedness" (68) which enables interaction between subjects and objects, 
self and other. She also disagrees to male critics' attitude in privileging "autonomous 
subjectivity or original writing as the locus of the authentic self (68) and sees this as 
"a way of ignoring that subjectivity(and writing) is always already filled with the 
voices of others" (68). 
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Unlike Friedman and Hooton, Lionnet points out that women's 
autobiographical writing can present a female writer's "struggles to articulate a 
personal vision and to verbalize the vast area of feminine experience which have 
remained unexpressed, if not repressed" (91). Lionnet sees women's autobiographical 
writing as "an attempt to excavate those elements of the female self which have been 
buried under the cultural and patriarchal myths of selfhood" (91). Therefore, we 
"witness the unfolding of an autobiographical project" when we "read a narrative that 
� 
depicts the journey of a female self striving to become the subject of her own 
，discourse" (91). 
Third Phase 
After two generations' debates on the self in autobiography, Paul John Eakin, 
in How Our Lives Become Stories (1999)，gives a thoughtful reflection on male critics 
and feminists of autobiography. He points out that one of the consequences of 
feminists' critical method is "to distinguish female from male autobiography" (48)， 
leaving "an unfortunate polarization by gender of the categories we use to define self 
and self-experience" (48). He discerns three most prominent categories that feminists 
use on the discussion of "male-female binaries" (48) are "the individual as opposed to 
the collective, the autonomous as opposed to the relational, and, in a different register, 
narrative as opposed to non-linear, discontinuous, non-teleological forms" (48). 
Although Eakin objects to feminists' binary thinking on the issue of self in 
autobiography, he does not support the Gusdorfian model. Eakin finds that "Gusdorfs 
stress on the separate, autonomous individual, Rousseau's celebration of his 
uniqueness and singularity" (49) have just been accepted "at face value" (49). 
Gusdorfs focus on subjectivity and autonomy of the self does not "accurately 
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describe Rousseau's self-representation in The Confessions” (49). However, feminist 
critics in the second generation, in reviewing Gusdorf s methodology, do not see that 
it is inappropriate not only in investigating the self in women's but also men's 
autobiographical writing. "Mason, Friedman, and other feminist critics" (49)， 
therefore, help to “keep the old Gusdorfian model in place~~paradoxically~by 
attacking it" (49). Feminists' attacks on the Gusdorfian model by introducing a binary 
thinking of the relational self in women's autobiographical writing express their 
� 
admiration of the autonomous self in men and thus, ignore the very core inadequacy 
« of the Gusdorfian model in the discussion of self. 
Eakin goes on to argue that there is "important evidence of relationality in 
men's autobiographies" (50). He suggests that "the criterion of relationality applies 
equally if not identically to male experience" (50). "All selfhood", he argues, "is 
relational despite differences that fall out along gender lines" (50). 
I adopt Eakin's view as the argument of my thesis in investigating the self in J. 
M. Coetzee's autobiographies Boyhood and Youth. 
I do not support the Gusdorfian model of self which manifests itself in a 
subjective and autonomous manner nor the feminist model which actually favours and 
strengthens Gusdorf s view. I adopt Eakin's theory together with Jessica Benjamin, 
Mikhail Bakhtin as well as Charles Taylor's discussion of self in order to spell out the 
myth of autonomy which, according to Eakin, "has marked the thinking of 
autobiographers and their critics, including feminists" (50-51). 
One of the inadequacies of Lionnet's theory is that she cannot get out of 
binary thinking. According to Eakin, Lionnet still thinks over the issue of relational 
identity through "the lens of gender" (51) and agrees to the code of the relational as 
feminine and the autonomous as masculine. Her treatment of relationality is still 
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trapped in patriarchal binaries that she tries to resist, according to Eakin. Lionnet 
acknowledges "the relational dimension of both men's and women's lives" (51). But 
the relational is not necessary feminine. Lionnet's reading exposes the same mistake 
that Mason and Friedman make. 
However, as Eakin puts it, “ '[rjelational' selves and lives are neither better 
nor worse—than 'autonomous' ones" (52). Autonomy requires the "dynamic of 
recognition" (52), thus, "identity is necessarily relational" (52). In opposition to 
feminists' reference to Nancy Chodorow's discussion of the relational self, I adopt 
o Jessica Benjamin's psychoanalysis on the formation of self in childhood experience to 
support my argument that all identity is relational. 
In The Bonds of Love (1988)，Benjamin presents a relational theory which, 
instead of focusing on the child-parents relationship in the Oedipal phase, investigates 
the formation of self in the pre-Oedipal phase in which mother and infant interact with 
each other. Her book analyzes the "interplay between love and domination" (5). 
Domination, as Benjamin perceives, works as a "two-way process, a system involving 
the participation of those who submit to power as well as those who exercise it" (5). 
Benjamin thinks that the Freudian psychoanalytic view on domination is inadequate. 
Freud imagines that the origin of civilization comes from the struggle between father 
and son. And guilt comes when the son has overthrown his father who embodies 
authority. Having gained authority, the son feels guilty and so re-establishes law and 
authority in his father's image. In Civilization and Its Discontent (1957)，Freud 
observes that human civilization works in a circular way in which guilt and 
restoration of authority come after revolt. 
However, Benjamin disagrees with Freud and instead, makes use of feminist 
criticism and reinterprets psychoanalytic theory on the problem of domination. Nor 
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does she support feminists' thought on the matter of domination. Benjamin argues 
that feminists do not admit the female part in the drama of domination: 
A sharper perspective on this matter is particularly important to feminist 
thought today, because a major tendency in feminism has constructed the 
problem of domination as a drama of female vulnerability victimized by male 
aggression. Even the more sophisticated feminist thinkers frequently shy away 
from the analysis of submission, for fear that in admitting women's 
� 
participation in the relationship of domination, the onus of responsibility will 
» appear to shift from men to women, and the moral victory from women to men. 
More generally, this has been a weakness of radical politics: to idealize the 
oppressed, as if their politics and culture were untouched by the system of 
domination, as if people did not participate in their own submission (Benjamin, 
9). 
Benjamin points out that feminists idealize women and put all the blame on men's 
aggression. By thinking along a binary "axis of gender", in Eakin's terms, feminists 
successfully create an image of the oppressed, in this case, women. To clear this 
thought, Benjamin shows "how domination originates in a transformation of the 
relationship between self and other" and suggests that "domination and submission 
result from a breakdown of the necessary tension between self-assertion and mutual 
recognition that allows self and other to meet as sovereign equals" (12). 
Self completes itself from gaining recognition from others. Benjamin defines 
recognition as a "response from the other which makes meaningful the feelings, 
intentions, and actions of the self (12). To apply recognition to the relationship 
between mother and infant, the process of recognition of the mother includes "a 
paradoxical mixture of otherness and togetherness" (15). The mother thinks that the 
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infant belongs to her but he is not part of her anymore. Such a paradox exists along 
with recognition from the mother who experiences joy in the infant's existence from 
“both” her connection to him “ancT his "independent existence" (15); the mother 
recognizes the infant. The content of recognition, according to Benjamin, entails a 
wish “to affirm, validate, acknowledge, know, accept, understand, empathize, take in, 
tolerate, appreciate, see, identify with, find familiar,...love" (15). When recognition 
works in two-way, ''mutual recognition” (15) is completed and manifests in the forms 
� 
of "emotional attunement, mutual influence, affective mutuality, sharing states of 
» mind" in mother-infant relationship (15). 
Benjamin disagrees with Margaret Mahler's theory of infant development 
which explains mother-infant relationship. In the late 1960s，Mahler argues that a 
child separates from the unity with his mother in order to attain individuation. In The 
Psychological Birth of the Human Infant (1975), Mahler defines the separation-
individuation process: 
We refer to the psychological birth of the individual as the separation-
individuation process: the establishment of a sense of separateness from, and 
relation to, a world of reality, particularly with regard to the experiences of 
one's own body and to the principal representative of the world as the infant 
experiences it, the primary love object (3). 
Mahler perceives that separation and individuation are two "complementary 
developments" in the growth of the child's self. Separation "consists of the child's 
emergence from a symbiotic fusion with the mother (Mahler, 1952), and individuation 
consists of those achievements making the child's assumption of his own individual 
characteristics" (4). 
19 
Benjamin finds the separation-individuation theory problematic since it emphasizes 
the "idea of separation from oneness". Mahler's theory assumes that people grow “out 
of' relationships rather than becoming active and sovereign “within” them (18). 
Benjamin disagrees with Mahler's view that the infant ends up in "singular oneness" 
by separating himself a state of "dual oneness" with his mother. 
Benjamin develops her theory from psychoanalyst and infancy researcher 
Daniel N. Stem. He disagrees with Freud, who sees "infants shielded from relatedness 
� 
by the "stimulus barrier" that protected them from having to register and deal with 
,external stimulation, including other people" (Stem, 44). He also disagrees with the 
classical Freudian view that the infant is not entirely "imdifferentiated(symbiotic)" 
(105) from the mother. Benjamin thinks that as we accept the thought that "infants do 
not begin life as part of an undifferentiated unity, the issue is not only how we 
separate from oneness, we become free of the other, but how we actively engage and 
make ourselves known in relationship to other" (18). 
She, therefore, proposes an idea of "intersubjective view" (19)，from which the 
infant responds to and differentiates from others. According to Benjamin, the 
‘‘intersubjective view maintains that the individual grows in and through the 
relationship to other subjects" (19). This perspective recognizes the entity of the other 
that the self meets as a subject, a self. Therefore, Benjamin's intersubjective theory 
differs from Mahler's separation-individuation theory in a sense that the former 
acknowledges both parties as subjects whereas the latter, presents a subject-object 
position in the mother-infant relationship. 
Benjamin's intersubjective theory emphasizes the "representation of self and 
other as distinct but interrelated beings" (19). Views of the two subjects in a 
relationship overlap and share a common domain where mutual recognition takes 
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place. Benjamin's theory filled in the lack of many theories of the self which neglect 
"the need for mutual recognition, the necessity of recognizing as well as being 
recognized by the other" (23). Benjamin reiterates that the importance of mutual 
recognition to the intersubjective view. The idea of mutual recognition "implies that 
we actually have a need to recognize the other as a separate person who is like us yet 
distinct" (23). When intersubjactivity occurs, both parties “lose themselves in each 
other without loss of self; they lose self-consciousness without loss of awareness" 
� 
(29). The parties are intersubjective as soon as they know the other party exists, feels 
，and thinks as they do. 
The separation-individuation theory is inadequate and inappropriate to analyze 
the self in Coetzee's autobiographies Boyhood and Youth. According to Benjamin, the 
‘‘sense of shared feeling of pleasurable connection" (31) is crucial in her 
intersubjective theory. However, such "emotional attunement" (31) is absent in the 
separation-individuation theory which only explains how the "mother protects the 
child's ego from anxiety so that it can separate" (31). Rather, Benjamin introduces 
"attunement" which "reintroduces the idea of pleasure, pleasure in being with the 
other, which had gotten lost in the transition from drive theory to ego psychology— 
but redefines it as pleasure in being with the other" (31). 
Benjamin's intersubjective theory is significant as it opposes the concept of 
internalization which suggests that the self needs to internalize "what is outside to 
develop what is inside" (42). When internalization occurs, the other is "consumed, 
incorporated, digested" (42) by the self. The internalization theory does not see the 
other as an individual by not mentioning the "joy of discovering the other, the agency 
of the self，and the outsideness of the other" (43). It is problematic as it defines 
“differentiation as separating oneself from the other rather than as coming together 
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with him, internalization theory describes an instrumental relationship" and "implies 
an autonomous individual defined by his ability to do without the 'need-satisfying 
object，，，（43). 
Benjamin's "intersubjactive dimension" (49) “demonstrates how 'we'-
experience shapes the trajectory of T-narrative, not only his own but the one he 
projects for his children" (Eakin, 75). Intersubjectivity refutes Gusdorfs emphasis on 
“r-experience but introducing the operation of "we"-experience in a relationship. In a 
� 
relationship, the self of each party is no longer subjective nor individual but relational 
and dialogic under "we"-experience. In autobiography, the use of the first person, 
therefore, gives “no shield against self-estrangement, early and late" (95). The first 
person narration as an indicator for subjective self does not stand. Eakin gives a 
precise account on the formation and operation of self identity in autobiography: 
As markers themselves, autobiographers are primed to recognize the 
constructed nature of the past, yet they need at the same time to believe 
that in writing about the past they are performing an act of recovery: 
narrative teleology models the trajectory of continuous identity, reporting 
the supreme fiction of memory as fact. "You" and ‘ T and "she" and "he" 
and "we"—the dialogic play of pronouns in these texts tracks the 
unfolding of relational identity in many registers, in discourse with others 
and within ourselves. The lesson these identity narratives are teaching, 
again and again, is that the self is dynamic, changing, and plural (98). 
Eakin's thought echoes Michael Holquist's explanation on Bakhtin's view that “ ‘self 
is dialogic, a relation" (19). In Dialogism (1990)，Holquist presents Bakhtin's idea of 
dialogism to explain the interplay between selves in a relationship. His treatment on 
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the parties in a relationship as distinct individuals supports Benjamin's intersubjective 
view. Holquist writes: 
Dialogism argues that all meaning is relative in the sense that it comes 
about only as a result of the relation between two bodies occupying 
simultaneous but different space, where bodies may be thought of as 
ranging from the immediacy of our physical bodies, to political bodies to 
bodies of ideas in general (ideologies) (20). 
I regard the self in Coetzee's autobiographies Boyhood and Youth as dialogic instead 
"ofmonologic and subjective. The self demonstrates a tendency of simultaneous being, 
in Holquist's word, being is always "co-being" {Dialogism, 25). I perceive Boyhood 
and Youth as "relational autobiographies" but they are different from Friedman's 
sense. Friedman proposes the term in 1985 to "characterize the model of selfhood in 
women's autobiographical writing, against the autonomous individual posited by 
Gusdorf, as interdependent and identified with a community" (Smith, Reading，201). I 
find Friedman's argument that women's autobiography demonstrates a tendency of 
shared identity and relationality to others which shape and complete the female self, 
inadequate. Both Benjamin and Holquist point out the intersubjactivity and co-being 
that exist between individuals in a relationship. Therefore, Eakin's argument that "all 
identity is relational" (Eakin, 43) stands. I will analyze the relational self in Boyhood 
and Youth to refute feminist critics' views that the relational self only exists in 
women's autobiography. I will draw on theories from Jessica Benjamin, Charles 
Taylor and Mikhail Bakhtin, who discuss different realizations and forms of 
relationality. By doing so, I hope to erase the polarization of feminists on the 
discussion of self in autobiography as well as the myth of autonomy which is regarded 
as a characteristic in men's autobiography. 
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Chapter Two 
The Relational Self in Boyhood 
In Reading Autobiography (2001)，Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson bring up 
the concept of "autobiographical relationality": 
While Eakin argues persuasively for the difference of life narrative in its 
proximity to historical materiality, Miller insists on the inextricability of 
� genre and gender ("Representing Others"). Both have pointed out that the 
notion of autobiographical relationality, taken to characterize the 
difference of women's autobiography in early feminist scholarship by such 
critics as Estelle Jelinek and Susan Stanford Friedman, in fact 
characterizes modes of relationship in much autobiographical writing by 
both men and women (141). 
Relationality in autobiography should not be treated as a gender issue. Feminists' 
polarization of self in women's autobiography as relational and men's as autonomous 
is not inappropriate to explain the self in Coetzee's Boyhood and Youth. Relationality 
exists in both men's and women's autobiographies. 
Autonomous self does not necessarily exist in men's autobiographical writing. 
The self in Shirley Geok-Lin Lim's autobiography Among the White Moon Face 
(1996) cannot be categorized by feminist autobiography critics' standards as relational. 
The protagonist manifests a strong tendency of autonomy in her growth: 
My Westernization took place in my body. As a young woman I wanted 
movement: the freedom of the traveler, the solipsism of the engine, the 
frenzy of speed, that single intensity inseparable from danger. I was drawn 
to motobikes the way I was drawn to fast music (89). 
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A similar example of the female self as autonomous in women's life writing 
can be found in Chang Jung's Wild Swans (1991). During the Cultural Revolution in 
China, girls behave collectively as masculine and aggressive: "Many girls tried to talk, 
walk, and act like aggressive, crude men, and ridiculed those who did not. There was 
not much possibility of expressing femininity anyway. To start with, we were not 
allowed to wear anything but the shapeless blue, grey or green trousers and jackets" 
(422). Despite the fact that Chang is a young woman, she feels a strong tendency that 
she does not belong to the sexless Communist atmosphere. She yearns to leave China 
<9 to see the world. She confesses: 
I [Chang Jung] was terribly curious about foreigners, and was eager to 
discover what they were really like. How similar to the Chinese were they, 
and how different? But I had to try to conceal my inquisitiveness which, 
apart from being politically dangerous, would be regarded as losing face 
(648). 
Chang's strong desire to go abroad is similar to that of John, who is not content with 
South African，the place he grew up in. In Wild Swans, Chang is sick of Chinese 
society's expectation on women: 
Much of Chinese society still expected its women to hold themselves in a 
sedate manner, lower their eyelids in response to men's stares, and restrict 
their smile to a faint curve of the lips which did not expose their teeth. They 
were not meant to use hand gestures at all. If they contravened any of these 
canons of behavior they would be considered 'flirtatious.' Under Mao, 
flirting with foreigners was an unspeakable crime(649). 
Under such an unequal circumstance, Chang wants to rebel against oppression of 
women: 
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I was furious at the innuendo against me. It had been my Communist parents 
who had given me a liberal upbringing. They had regarded the restrictions 
on women as precisely the sort of thing a Communist revolution should put 
an end to. But now oppression of women joined hands with political 
repression, and served resentment and petty jealousy (649). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that she treasures an opportunity to study in 
England so much: 
This freedom to see the world, a freedom I [Chang] could not dream of， 
tormented me. Because it had been impossible, my desire to go abroad had 
always remained firmly imprisoned in my subconscious (664). 
The protagonist Chang strongly expresses her yearning to be free and her passion to 
“fly by" her nets in China, just as John does in Boyhood and Youth, If one claims that 
the self in Boyhood and Youth is autonomous, the self is only observed “at face value" 
(Ealdn,51). 
The self in Boyhood is relational. It conforms to Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic 
theory. I take dialogism to support my argument that Boyhood presents a relational 
self because autobiography, as a kind of writing about life, deals with the problem of 
human existence, "bi Dialogism (1990)，Michael Holquist writes: 
‘Being’ for Bakhtin then is, not just an event, but an event that is shared. 
Being is a simultaneity; it is always co-being (25). 
In dialogism, "being" is treated as a shared event. A person's being is not just an 
event of his own but that shared by others because the person himself is not the only 
component in the making of his self. Nobody can really detach entirely from their 
significant others even though they succeed to gain a certain degree of autonomy. 
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According Charles Taylor in the essay "The Politics of Recognition" in 
Multiculturalism (1994)， 
We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle 
against, the things our significant others want to see in us. Even after we 
outgrow some of these o t h e r s o u r parents, for instance一and they 
disappear from our lives, the conversation with them continues within us 
as long as we live (33). 
� 
Taylor points out that a self is an ongoing process. Our contacts with and influences 
�f r o m our significant others do not leave us even though we "outgrow" them. We may 
not agree to their thoughts, attitudes, values anymore but those values have, more or 
less, become part of our selves. Rejection of significant others' values imposed on us 
can happen only after we have a grasp of consciousness to a certain extent. Human 
minds were bom with nothing. Human education is a process of moving from a lower 
consciousness to a higher one. After a baby is bom, information and values given by 
its significant others, such as parents, lift it up to a higher consciousness level until 
one day he decides to reject the influences of his parents. But he needs a base of 
rejection. The very foundation of his consciousness is made up and shaped by his 
parents. Therefore, when we want to liberate ourselves from our significant others, we 
should know that we cannot completely detach from their values because they have 
already become part of ourselves and they also comprise the wish to such liberation. 
Hence, the argument of an absolute autonomous self does not stand. Self is 
always relational. We, as a subject, see others as objects. At the same time, others see 
us as objects. A famous example to illustrate this point by Bakhtin is discussed by 
Holquist. When A stands in front of B, A cannot see the back of his head but B can, 
and vice versa. This example reveals a fact that each person has a blind spot. There 
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must be some thing that one cannot see in himself but only others can. When this 
happens, the person being seen is no longer a subject but an object; he becomes the 
other. It is in this sense that "being" is an event shared, and such a shared event is 
comprised of myriad of vis-a-vis relationships. There is a self and an other in each 
relationship in a certain point of time. But the self and other roles in the relationship 
are not fixed. At a certain point of time, one can be the self. A moment passes, he 
might become the other and his company becomes the self if there is a shift of 
� 
perspective. This illustrates Bakhtin's understanding that “[b]eing is a simultaneity; it 
is always co-being" (Holquist, Dialogism, 33). 
"Co-being" is not soundless; it is not only realized and manifested in the form 
of consciousness but also language. In Sources of the Self (1989) Taylor writes: 
There is no way we could be inducted into personhood except by being 
initiated into a language. We first leam our languages of moral and 
spiritual discernment by being brought into an ongoing conversation by 
those who bring us up. The meanings that the key words first had for me 
are the meanings they have for us, that is, for me and my conversation 
partners together (34). 
Taylor points out the significance of language in shaping our personhood. The 
sources of language are often our significant others. They teach us language and 
model our personhood. But it should be noted that the language itself does not have 
meanings for us. It is through the "co-being" of me and my significant other that the 
language delivered means to me. In other words, relationship comes first; meanings 
second. Therefore, as Taylor goes on, "one cannot be a self on one's own. I am a self 
only in relation to certain interlocutors: in one way in relation to those conversation 
partners who were essential to my achieving self-definition; in another in relation to 
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those who are now crucial to my continuing grasp of languages of self-
understanding." (34). A self exists only within in what Taylor calls "webs of 
interlocution" (34). 
Boyhood presents a self that exists in a "web of interlocution". Coetzee 
presents John, the autobiographical hero's relational self, through strings of 
relationships which make up a "web of interlocution". Each relationship in the “web 
of interlocution" reveals part of the relational self of John. I am going to examine the 
� 
operation and meaning of John's relational self in each of his relationships with his 
取 significant others. In other words, I examine how John sees himself as a self and is 
seen as the other in each of his relationships with a significant other. His relationship 
with his mother comes first. 
Boyhood presents a "family memoir" (Eakin, 85) in which the mother is, in 
Eakin's term, John's "proximate other" (86). Unlike many autobiographies, Boyhood 
does not use the "first person referent" (Smith & Watson，60). Rather it is told in the 
third person in a way that the protagonist is referred as "he". This fictional mode of 
autobiographical writing belongs to the “autobiography in the person" (Lejeune, 7). 
In On Autobiography (1989)，according to Philippe Lejeune's categorization, the 
"autobiography in the person" presents two criteria: 
"grammatical person"=HE 
"identity"=narrator=principal character (7) 
This fictional mode of third person autobiography is under a subtitle of “3 a 
Autobiography" in which "Pact=0 (let's understand by pact the pact of the title or the 
prefatory pact). The reader establishes the author-narrator-protagonist identity 
although it is not the object of any solemn declaration”（16). 
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The author of Boyhood is a "relational autobiographer" (Eakin, 86) who 
explores his self in relation to others. Boyhood starts with the protagonist John's 
relationship with his mother because mother is regarded as a significant other who 
contributes much at the beginning of their lives. Therefore, when we come to a stage 
of life where we want to liberate ourselves from our significant others, mother 
becomes a centre of discussion and the origin of conflicts. If John's self was 
autonomous, he would not fall into struggle with significant others. In 
� 
Multiculturalism (1994)，Taylor has the following view: 
• It is true that we can never liberate ourselves completely from those whose 
love and care shaped us early in life, but we should strive to define 
ourselves on our own to the fullest extent possible, coming as best as we 
can to understand and thus get some control over the influence of our 
parents, and avoiding falling into any more such dependent relationships 
(33). 
John's struggles and pains come from his wish to liberate himself from his mother 
who is significant to him in his upbringing. There is a force that pulls him to become 
an autonomous person but at the same time there is also a force that pulls him back to 
his mother. He reiterates his fear of losing her. He will not know who he is once she 
leaves him because she has already become part of his self; she is the source of his 
self. On many occasions, John identifies with his mother. The beginning chapter of 
Boyhood is all about John's relationship with his mother. Being "trapped" is an 
important idea in the chapter and it becomes a significant motif throughout Boyhood 
and Youth. John's mother is trapped in the house, in the patriarchal society: "Trapped 
in this box of a house on the housing estate, there is nothing for his mother to do all 
day but sweep and tidy" {Boyhood, 2). 
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The image of his mother is of a woman who wants freedom but cannot liberate 
herself from her family. She is not only physically trapped in the patriarchal society 
but also mentally trapped. She wants to liberate herself from the physical trap. 
Therefore, she wants to buy a horse to ride. 
His mother is restless too. I wish I had a horse, she says. Then at least I 
could go riding in the veld. A horse! says his father: Do you want to be 
Lady Godiva? 
� 
She does not buy a horse. Instead, without warning, she buys a bicycle, a 
* woman's model, second-hand, painted black. It is so huge and heavy that, 
when he experiments with it in the yard, he cannot turn the pedals. 
She does not know how to ride a bicycle; perhaps she does not know how 
to ride a horse either. She bought the bicycle thinking that riding it would 
be a simple matter. Now she can find no one to teach her. 
His father cannot hide his glee. Women do not ride bicycles, he says. His 
mother remains defiant. I will not be a prisoner in this house, she says, I 
will be free. (2-3) 
John's mother's wish to ride on a horse implies not only a physical liberation 
in a sense that she can get out of the house physically but also sexual freedom. John's 
mother, in this sense, is in the quest of autonomy. Yet, she fails because being is 
dialogic. She practices riding a bicycle but is returned with laughter and mockery 
from her son and husband who form a patriarchal alliance. She feels pressured 
because her being is dialogic. She subjectively wishes she had a horse. She is a 
subject in the matter of wishing to buy a horse. The use of direct speech reveals her 
subjectivity: "I wish I had a horse, she says". If the sentence were to put like this: 
“She wished she had a horse, she said", her subjectivity would be revealed through 
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Coetzee the author. The use of "I" instead of "she" in this case aims to pinpoint the 
centre position of John's mother, in other words, as a subject. When she says "I wish I 
had a horse，，，in her vis-a-vis relationship with John's father, she is the subject; "I" 
conveys her subjectivity. But we see John's father's subjectivity. In John's father's 
eyes, the woman riding a horse would become "Lady Godiva", which is somewhat 
silly. John's father makes this utterance from a subjective position; John's mother 
becomes an object. From John's father's perspective, "women do not ride bicycles". 
� But John's mother remains defiant. Again, Coetzee the author lets her utter from a 
* subjective position by using "I": "I will not be a prisoner in this house.. .1 will be free" � . 
The use of "I" for John's mother's utterance, apart from showing her 
subjectivity, echoes and foreshadows John's endeavour of liberating himself on his 
quest for identity. “I will be free" is an utterance of his mother as well as John. 
Throughout Boyhood and Youth, John wants to get out of the trap of his mother's love 
to gain autonomy. Such a quest is a road to freedom. Therefore, John and his mother 
are in this sense similar. And this episode functions as a parallel to John's acquisition 
in later chapters of the book. 
Apart from John's mother's subjectivity, we see John's own subjectivity in the 
incident of her riding a bicycle. This shows that John's mother's self is also dialogical. 
Only once does he catch a glimpse of her on her bicycle. She is wearing a 
white blouse and a dark shirt. She is coming down Poplar Avenue toward 
the house. Her hair streams in the wind. She looks young, like a girl， 
young and fresh and mysterious (3). 
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The above passage is written from John's subjectivity. In his eyes, his mother 
becomes an object who looks "young and fresh and mysterious". His mother remains 
an object in John and his father's utterance. 
Trap\ Trap�, they call out, mocking her: Push! There is nothing funny 
about the jokes, though he and his father always laugh together afterwards. 
As for his mother, she never has any repartee, she is not gifted in that way. 
'Laugh if you like,' she says (4). 
� 
The utterances in quotes reveals John's and his father's subjectivity. But the 
passage "There is...she is not gifted in that way" is told from the adult 
narrator's/author's perspective. We see an intersubjectivity of John's, John's father 
and the adult narrator's to have a rather objective view upon the bicycle incident in 
which John's mother is seen as an object by her significant others. 
But the mother does not always stand as a victim, an object gazed upon by the 
boy and the father. In order to stand against the failing father, the mother wants to 
possess the boy. Her sacrifice and love is instrumental. Through the boy's eyes we see 
the mother's intention. 
As for hiin[John], what does the fierce and angry emotion he feels for his 
mother have to do with the deliquescent swooning on the screen? His 
mother loves him, that he acknowledges; but that is the problem, that is 
what is wrong, not what is right, with her attitude toward him. Her love 
emerges about all in her watchfulness, her readiness to pounce and save 
him should he ever be in danger. Should he choose (but he would never do 
so), he could relax into her care and for the rest of his life be borne by her. 
It is because he is so sure of her care that he is on his guard with her，never 
relaxing, never allowing her a chance (122). 
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This kind of love is disastrous since it puts the boy in a trap. In this sense, the 
mother simply locks up the boy the same way as she was by his husband. The boy and 
the mother are in a trap. The boy wants to get out of this kind of cage love. However, 
this chapter does not end with the boy's gaining autonomy from his mother as many 
other modem autobiographies do. The boy does not finally leave his mother and 
concludes that she is to blame in psychologically tormenting her son. Rather, he feels 
guilty in thinking of “never allowing her a chance" (122). The boy comes to, in 
Benjamin's term, an "intersubjective view" to think himself into the existence of his 
• mother. 
Feeling her hurt，feeling it as intimately as if he[John] were part of her, she 
part of him, he knows he is in a trap and cannot get out. Whose fault is it? 
He blames her, he is cross with her, but he is ashamed of his ingratitude 
too. Love: this is what love really is, a cage in which he rushes back and 
forth, back and forth, like a poor bewildered baboon. What can ignorant, 
innocent Aunt Annie know about love? He knows a thousand times more 
about the world than she does, slaving her life away over her father's 
crazy manuscript. His heart is old, it is dark and hard, a heart of stone. 
That is his contemptible secret (122-23). 
All the pain that the boy suffers in his family is nobody's fault. The boy comes up 
with an understanding of his mother's love for him. He can imagine her being hurt 
once he gets out of her trap. He suddenly comes to an understanding that "he were 
part of her，she part of him" (122). His realization is no longer a subjective one. He 
can really study his mother's heart. This is an expression of recognition and empathy. 
Such an ethical attitude manifested is different from a conventional autonomous 
arrangement of the self. 
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The motif of "trap" resonates throughout the book. When we come to Chapter 
18，the mother still maintains a significant role in the self of the boy. She resolves to 
pay for her husband's debts. But the boy always knows that this is just a gesture to 
trap him more tightly. 
Her ant-like determination angers him to the point that he wants to strike her. 
It is clear what lies behind it. She wants to sacrifice herself for her children. 
� Sacrifice without end: he is all too familiar with that spirit. But once she has 
sacrificed herself entirely, once she has sold the clothes off her back, sold her 
very shoes, and is walking around on bloody feet, where will that leave him? 
It is a thought he cannot bear (158). 
He has been pursuing autonomy throughout the book. The mother's resolution of love 
suffocates the boy. His wish to be free becomes bigger and bigger. The mother here is 
depicted as a selfish sacrificing mother just like Virginia Woolfs mother (Ruddick， 
'Learning', 181-200). The discussion of this kind of cage love, until now, is presented 
from the boy's perspective, though at some point with emphathy towards the mother. 
But as we read on, the latter part reveals a change of perspective. The boy switches 
from the position of a subject to that of an object. His otherness is revealed in the eyes 
of his mother: 
His mother stands at the sink, in the dimmest comer of the kitchen. She 
stands with her back to him, her arms flecked with soapsuds, scouring a 
pot, in no great hurry. As for him, he is roaming around, talking about 
something, he does not know what, talking with his usual vehemence, 
complaining. 
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She turns from her chore; her gaze flickers over him. It is a considered 
look, and without any fondness. She is not seeing him for the first time. 
Rather, she is seeing him as he has always been and as she as always 
known him to be when she is not wrapped up in illusion. She sees him, 
sums him up, and is not pleased. She is even bored with him [Boyhood, 
161). 
� The image of a selfish sacrificing mother is broken down. She is no longer an object 
but a subject. For the first time “her gaze flickers over him". Coetzee makes use of the 
power relations in a gaze which entails a subject and an object. The boy becomes an 
object to receive the mother's gaze: "She sees him, sums him up, and is not pleased." 
We know that in the eyes of the mother, the boy's vehemence and complaints are 
trivial. His self is in relation to his mother. His otherness is revealed. 
But the boy and the mother are not forever in tension. In an epiphany the boy 
realizes the predicament that his mother faces and so understands that she is an 
independent person, a subject. 
This woman was not brought into the world for the sole purpose of loving 
him and protecting him and taking care of his wants. On the contrary, she 
had a life before he came into being, a life in which there was no 
requirement upon her to give him the slightest thought. At a certain time in 
her life she bore him; she bore him and she decided to love him; perhaps 
she chose to love him even before she bore him; nevertheless, she chose to 
love him, and therefore she can choose to stop loving him (162). 
The importance of free will is emphasized. In earlier chapters, the boy appears 
to be a resolute person on his quest for autonomy. But as Boyhood comes to the end, 
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the idea of autonomy is shattered. Not only is he seen as an object from the subject 
position of his mother, in his subjective view upon his mother his attitude changes. He 
begins to see her as a subject as well and recognizes her as such. 
This passage asserts Bakhtin's view that "being is co-being." The relational 
self of the boy is not only shown in his relationship with his mother. Aunt Annie is an 
important figure to reveal the otherness of the boy: 
� 
‘You know so much，，Aunt Annie once said to him. It was not praise: 
» though her lips were pursed in a smile, she was shaking her head at the 
same time. ‘So young and yet you know so much. How are you going to 
keep it all in your head?' And she leaned over and tapped his skull with a 
bony finger. 
The boy is special, Aunt Annie told his mother, and his mother in turn told 
him. But what kind of special? No one ever says (165). 
When Aunt Annie dies, the boy refuses to go to the funeral at first. "He does not like 
ugly old bodies" (163) and "the thought of old people taking off their clothes makes 
him shudder" (163). We see from the boy's perspective that he is full of disgust 
towards old people. However, when he finally comes to see her, he becomes an object 
in Aunt Annie's comment. It should be noted that only Aunt Annie speaks or only 
Aunt Annie's speech is quoted in the book. This arrangement points out the subject 
position of Aunt Aimie. She is the one to recognize the boy. In this recognition he 
becomes the other. And his self in this sense is no longer autonomous but relational, 
to Aunt Annie. Aunt Annie's act of tapping the boy's "skull" with ‘‘a bony finger，，， 
the narrator suggests that the boy cannot get rid of mortality any more than Aunt 
Annie can. Mortality is the commonality between the boy and Aunt Annie. And from 
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such commonality lies the recognition of Aunt Annie as a significant other of the boy. 
Because he knows a lot, because he is gifted, he has the responsibility to keep what he 
knows including the books, Aunt Annie and everything in his memory. So it goes: 
What has happened to Aunt Annie's books?' he asks his mother later, 
when they are alone again. He says books, but he only means Ewige 
Genesing in its many copies. 
� His mother does not know or will not say. From the flat where she broke 
her hip to the hospital to the old age home in Stikland to Woltemade no. 3 
no one has given a thought to the books except perhaps Aunt Annie 
herself, the books that no one will ever read; and now Aunt Annie is lying 
in the rain waiting for someone to find the time to bury her. He alone is 
left to do the thinking. How will he keep them all in his head, all the books, 
all the people, all the stories? And if he does not remember them, who will? 
{Boyhood, 166) 
According to Bakhtin, the books and Aunt Annie constitute the boy's "speaking 
position". It is from this unique position that his answerability comes. By 
remembering, speaking and writing about the books and people, Coetzee defines 
himself since they constitute his uniqueness. 
The emphasis on the responsibility for the books and the people, moreover, 
echoes the passage on his first memory. After letting the sweet wrapper go, the boy 
thinks that "he must go back to the Swartberg Pass and find it and rescue it." The 
sweet wrapper, like Aunt Annie and the books, are part of his memory. They 
constitute his unique self. By uttering them, he defines himself. Therefore, he has the 
same resolution as the end: "That is his duty: he may not die until he has done it" (31). 
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His self, in this sense, is not just a self of his own but entails significant others 
including Aunt Annie, the books and things in his memory. 
So much about the boy's stories of the people in his family, his self is 
relational to other things. We have looked at the boy's relational self as a son and a 
nephew. Now we come to study relational self in terms of his cultural and language 
identities. When South Africans in the 1940s usually prefer the Americans, the boy 
prefers Russians. Such is a deliberate will to rebel against social norms. That the boy 
� 
admits that he prefers the Russians when everyone in South Africa prefers the 
* Americans points out his pursuit of autonomy. It was a time of the cold war during 
which the Americans stood opposed to the Russians. Under capitalism, South Africa 
was overwhelmed by the influence of American culture. Coetzee once discusses this 
in his essay "What Is a Classic?" when he reasons over Bach's influence in the 1940s 
South Africa. The boy manifests his liking of the Russians as follows: 
Preferring the Russians to the Americans is a secret so dark that he can 
reveal it to no one. Liking the Russians is a serious matter. It can have you 
ostracized {Boyhood, 26). 
Though the fervour of that year, when a wave of enmity against the 
Russians suddenly burst out on the radio and everyone had to take sides, 
has subsided, he retains his secret loyalty: loyalty to the Russians, but even 
more loyalty to himself as he was when he did the drawings. 
There is no one here in Worcester who knows he likes the Russians (26). 
In Worcester no one but he likes the Russians. His loyalty to the Red Star 
sets him absolutely apart (27). 
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The isolated position of Soviet Russia is implied. It is obvious that South 
Africans prefer the Americans whereas the boy identifies with the Russians. Such an 
identification, however, is not based on deep understanding of the beliefs and 
rationales behind the two different social systems but a mere boyish preference: 
His mother's name is Vera: Vera, with its icy capital V, an arrow plunging 
downwards. Vera, she once told him, was a Russian name. When the 
Russians and the Americans were first set before him as antagonists 
� 
between whom he had to choose ('Who do you like, Smuts or Malan? 
Who do you like, Superman or Captain Marvel? Who do you like, the 
Russians or the Americans?'), he chose the Russians as he chose the 
Romans: because he likes the letter r, particularly the capital R, the 
strongest of all the letters (27). 
The boy's preference for the Russians comes from a childish and ignorant 
identification with his mother. His childish wish behind his stance reveals that his 
choice is merely a way to stand against the adults' world. That “he chose the Russians 
in 1947 when everyone else was choosing the Americans" (27) makes the boy feel 
unique; he becomes the subject and sees the world as the object. 
But this subjective view is not his whole self. 
Then came the realization, from the disapproval of his parents, from the 
puzzlement of his friends, from what they reported when they told their own 
parents about him: liking the Russians was not part of the game, it was not 
allowed (27-28). 
Thoughts and remarks of his parents and friends partly constitute the self of 
the boy. They are his significant others. When the boy realizes that disapproval of 
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these significant others has the force to pull him away from his liking of the Russians, 
which is a sign to show his will to become autonomous, his self is no longer 
autonomous but relational. 
A similar realization happens in the boy's preference for Roman Catholics. He 
undergoes the same realization that the Roman Catholics in his imagination are 
different from those in reality. 
He chose to be a Roman Catholic, that fateful morning, because of Rome, 
� 
because of Horatius and his two comrades, swords in their hands, crested 
helmets on their heads, indomitable courage in their glance, defending the 
bridge over Tiber against the Etruscan hordes. Now, step by step, he 
discovers from the other Catholic boys what a Roman Catholic really is. A 
Roman Catholic has nothing to do with Rome. Roman Catholics have not 
even heard of Horatius. Roman Catholics go to catechism on Friday 
afternoons; they go to confession; they take communion. That is what 
Roman Catholics do (20). 
The boy chooses to be a Roman Catholic from the same wish as he chooses to 
prefer the Russians. His preference for Roman Catholics comes from his liking of 
Horatius, whom he leams from books. By identifying with a culture which Horatius, 
his role model, comes from, the boy feels that he becomes part of Horatius. However, 
there is a gap between subjective wish and reality. When Protestantism is the 
strongest religion in South Africa, the boy who claims to be a Roman Catholic 
himself becomes the centre of attacks. He is discriminated against by Protestants in 
school by his friends. By the discrimination of these significant others his self is 
manifested in a relational way. When he sees himself as a Roman Catholic, he is 
proud of all the bravery and virtues a Roman Catholic should possess from his 
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learning in books about Roman Catholicism. But when others see him as a Roman 
Catholic, they think he is inferior and violates the "legitimate" values of Protestantism. 
The same self-other relationship is fully explored in the boy's cultural and 
language identities. As an Afrikaner growing up in colonial South Africa, the boy is 
not proud and even ashamed of his Afrikaans origin. His shame of his Afrikaans self 
is shown through his identification with English. 
Because they speak English at home, because he always comes first in 
� 
English at school, he thinks of himself as English. Though his surname is 
* Afrikaans, though his father is more Afrikaans than English, though he 
himself speaks Afrikaans without an English accent, he could not pass for 
a moment as an Afrikaner. The range of Afrikaans he commands is thin 
and bodiless; there is a whole dense world of slang and allusion 
commanded by real Afrikaans b o y s o f which obscenity is only a p a r t -
to which he has no access (124). 
Language is an important sign to give identification to a person. Language, 
which functions like gender and class, gives a group of people a collective identity. 
People speaking the same language belong to the same group who share similar 
values, power and status. Language also suggests a person's identity. The boy speaks 
English so “he thinks of himself as English". English, as the language of the 
colonizing, suggests superiority in colonial South Africa. As a colonial who wants to 
get rid of the situation of being colonized as an inferior, the boy takes the English 
language as a sign to show that he has something similar to the English; he speaks the 
same language as the English. Through speaking the same language he wishes he can 
join the English and share their identity as English and so their superiority. But in 
affiliating English, his Afrikaans remains as good as it should be. Therefore, he does 
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not idendify the English by denying his Afrikaans origin. Rather, he is torn between 
the two languages which reveals that he is in tension with his English self and 
Afrikaans self. This is what makes him suffer. He is not fully English as he knows 
“his surname is Afrikaans" and his father is "more Afrikaans than English". He is 
physiologically Afrikaans since he has the blood of an Afrikaner. But he is not fully 
Afrikaans either. There is “a whole dense world of slang and allusion commanded by 
real Afrikaans boys~of which obscenity is only a p a r t t o which he has no access" 
(124). The boy does not think of himself as a "real" Afrikaner. He is not fully 
** Afrikaanized to the roots. In other words, he is neither fully English nor Afrikaans. He 
is incomplete, a hybrid of English and Afrikaans. 
Yet, he is not comfortable with the hybridity of being English and Afrikaans. 
There is always a force that pulls him towards Afrikaans: 
When he speaks Afrikaans all the complications of life seem suddenly to 
fall away. Afrikaans is like a ghostly envelope that accompanies him 
everywhere, that he is free to slip into, becoming at once another person, 
simpler, gayer, lighter in his tread (125). 
He is "gayer" and "lighter" in his Afrikaans self. But he is not content with 
this fact. His shame of being Afrikaans comes from the inferiority of Afrikaans in 
colonial South Africa. The boy does not want to be inferior but he cares about the 
inferiority given to him in Afrikaans which gives him ease. Every moment, he is 
aware that he is Afrikaans. 
One thing about the English that disappoints him, that he will not imitate, 
is their contempt for Afrikaans. When they lift their eyebrows and 
superciliously mispronounce Afrikaans words, as if veld spoken with a v 
43 
were the sign of a gentleman, he draws back from them: they are wrong, 
and, worse than wrong, comical. For his part, he makes no concessions, 
even among the English: he brings out the Afrikaans words as they ought 
to be brought out, with all their hard consonants and difficult vowels (125). 
The question of ethnic discrimination is revealed. Among the English, the boy 
finds himself Afrikaans. And he asserts his Afrikaanness by speaking the language 
correctly. He cannot fully get into the English circle and at the same time, he cannot 
� 
abandon his Afrikaans roots. When a stimulus, the English discrimination against the 
Afrikaans language, comes, the boy asserts his Afrikaanness to redefine himself. His 
standing against the English is no longer autonomous. His uttering of correct 
Afrikaans consonants and vowels is based on the values imposed on him by the 
English. He knows that the English think Afrikaans inferior, as an Afrikaner who 
shares the inferiority, he stands up to proclaim his equality with the English. In the 
above incident, the boy reacts from the position of an object, the object of the English 
which suggests inferiority. The English discrimination constitutes his self; his self is 
relational. 
The boy goes on to discover more and more how the English see him as an 
object. 
In the Afrikaans classes, on the other hand, there are no boys with English 
surnames. In the senior school he knows of one Afrikaans Smith who 
might as well be a Smit; that is all. It is a pity, but understandable: what 
Englishman would want to marry an Afrikaans woman and have an 
Afrikaans family when Afrikaans women are either huge and fat, with 
puffed-out breasts and bullfrog necks, or bony and misshapen? (125) 
44 
The boy detaches from the subjective position to a collective realm in which 
he and other boys at school share the same identity: Afrikaans. That no boys in the 
Afrikaans classes have English surnames shows that all of them come from Afrikaans 
origin; their fathers are Afrikaans. That he knows “one Afrikaans Smith who might as 
well be a Smit" shows that every Afrikaner has a lack. "Smith" is an English surname 
whereas "Smit", probably an Afrikaans one. The omission of the "h" in "Smit" does 
not only refer to an Afrikaans name but also implies the lack of the Afrikaans boy. 
Then the boy moves on to imagine no Englishman would want to marry an Afrikaans 
» woman since Afrikaans women are ugly and huge. Both the Afrikaans boy and the 
Afrikaans women are inferior to the English. Being one of those, the protagonist 
expresses a collective identity with the Afrikaans through the collective inferiority 
Afrikaners possess. He, the Afrikaans boy and all Afrikaans women speak from the 
position of the other and such otherness constitutes the self of the protagonist. 
To speak from the position of the object does not mean that the protagonist 
wants to become an object. I argue that throughout Boyhood，Coetzee, the adult 
narrator, provides two perspectives on each net in the boy's quest of the self. From 
time to time, we know the boy's subjective wish as well as his realization of how 
others see him. The following speaks from his subjective view. 
The thought of being turned into an Afrikaans boy, with shaven head and 
no shoes, makes him quail. It is like being sent to prison, to a life without 
privacy. He cannot live without privacy. If he were Afrikaans he would 
have to live every minute of every day and night in the company of others. 
It is a prospect he cannot bear (126). 
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So much for his struggle between his Afrikaans self and English self, the 
protagonist actually finds himself more inclined towards Englishness. "The thought of 
being turned into an Afrikaans boy" quails him. He does not see himself Afrikaans, or 
at least, not yet fully Afrikaans. He even compares "being turned into an Afrikaans 
boy" to "being sent to prison，，. Among English, he is an outsider. He stands out as an 
outsider, an Afrikaner. Among Afrikaners, he is an outsider too. His English self pulls 
him away from them. He subjectively defines himself as non-Afrikaans, more 
� 
inclined to be English if allowed. 
However, the adult narrator Coetzee provides another perspective towards the 
same event. We see a non-centred perspective, the perspectives of others on the same 
event. 
It is a hot afternoon. In the shop there are strips of biltong hanging from 
the ceiling, and flies everywhere. He is about to tell the boy behind the 
counter—an Afrikaans boy older than himself—that he wants twenty 
Springbok plain when a fly flies into his mouth. He spits it out in disgust. 
The fly lies on the counter before him, struggling in a pool of saliva. 
'SiesT says one of the other customers. 
He wants to protest: 'What must I do? Must I not spit? Must I swallow the 
fly? I am just a child!' But explanations count for nothing among these 
merciless people. He wipes the spit off the counter with his hand amid 
disapproving silence pays for the cigarettes (127). 
The incident of buying cigarettes reveals the protagonist's alienation from 
Afrikaans culture. The protagonist's father sends him to buy cigarettes. The boy has 
two choices: either to "the town centre, where there are proper shops with display 
windows and cash registers" (126) or to "the little Afrikaans shop near the railway 
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crossing, which is just a room at the back of a house with a counter painted dark 
brown and almost nothing on the shelves" (127). Among the English and the 
Afrikaans, he “chooses the nearer" which is the Afrikaans shop. The boy's decision, 
though more of a result of his preference for convenience, does carry an interpretive 
meaning on his ethnic identity. He chooses to go into the circle of the Afrikaners. 
When the fly flies into his mouth, he must spit it out. But his spitting annoys other 
Afrikaans customers. At the beginning, the protagonist reveals his disgust for his 
� 
Afrikaans identity, Afrikaans women and even the "Afrikaans boy older than himself 
(127) in the shop. But now the position has been changed. The event of his spitting is 
looked at and condemned by other Afrikaans customers. The boy is despised; he 
becomes an object, inferior even among those he despises. He becomes the Other. 
After revealing this sense of otherness, the ethical question of "whose fault is it?” is 
implied. The boy, therefore, presents his helplessness and unwillingness by saying "I 
am just a child". That “1 am just a child" is a motif that also appears when the boy 
rejects his mother's cage love: "Unfair! he wants to cry: I am just a child!"(160) We 
are reminded that the protagonist who has yearns for an autonomous self is no more 
than a child, dependent and reliant on others. He not only gives a vision of his family 
tragedy but also on ethnic inequality. Such an ethical lift illuminates the realm of 
individuals seeking autonomy and professes the helplessness and futility of the 
autonomous self under the strong force of others' recognition and disapproval. 
The world of dialogism is fully revealed in Boyhood. Again and again, the 
boy's subjective view upon a certain issue is revealed. In return, significant others 
come to view the boy as an object; their views constitute his self. On the issue of 
identifying with English culture, the protagonist undergoes the following self 
reasoning: 
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Should he keep it a secret, this attachment of his to England? 
He cannot understand why it is that so many people around him dislike 
England. England is Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain. England is doing 
one's duty and accepting one's fate in a quiet, unfussy way. England is the 
boy at the battle of Jutland, who stood by his guns while the deck was 
burning under him. England is Sir Lancelot of the Lake and Richard the 
Lionheart and Robin Hood with his longbow of yew and his suit of 
� 
Lincoln green. What do Afrikaners have to compare? (128) 
" We leam about the boy's subjective consciousness that he is mesmerized by 
the English charms. His reasoning and citing heroic examples in English history, in 
our eyes, sounds childish and naive because we know more than the boy, in his 
circumstance, does. The question "Should he keep it a secret, this attachment of his to 
England?" is for the boy himself as well as for us, the readers. In revealing the boy's 
self reasoning and struggle of identity we are given a glimpse of his consciousness in 
which he stands as the centre. But this is not all. Boyhood differs from other 
autobiographies of autonomous aesthetic in a sense that it presents others' 
perspectives in addition to the protagonist's. 
From the above passage we see a total inclination and assertion towards 
English culture. But as we read on, the boy becomes the other. 
When the English talk like that he falls silent. There is the English 
language which he commands with ease. There is England and everything 
that England stands for, to which he believes he is loyal. But more than 
that is required, clearly, before one will be accepted as truly English: tests 
to face, some of which he knows he will not pass (129). 
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The protagonist is able to see himself as the Other; he reaches a realization of 
his otherness. Subjectively he wishes to become English and thinks himself English to 
a considerable extent. But he has a lack. He lacks the names and homes that English 
boys possess. The "proper English boys, with English names and homes in the old, 
leafy part of Worcester" are real English. He is just a pretence. He has home and 
history flowing in his veins. He understands that his English self comes largely from 
his language proficiency in English but to become fully English requires more than 
that. It requires legitimate blood, social status and the world in which English live. At 
，this point, he detaches from his subjective self and sees his otherness. He realizes his 
loyalty to England is merely a subjective wish; he is never objectively accepted as a 
member. In other words, in relation to real English, he is in fact, an Afrikaner. He 
knows he is an outsider. 
Despite realizing the differences between him and the English, 
the boy reveals his admiration for the English everywhere. 
The real English do not go to a school like St Joseph's. But on the streets 
of Rondebosch, on their way to and from their own schools, he can see 
them every day, can admire their straight blond hair and golden skins, 
their clothes that are never too small or too large, their quiet confidence. 
They josh each other(a word he knows from the public-school stories he 
has read) in an easy way, without the raucousness and clumsiness he is 
used to. He has no aspiration to join them, but he watches and tries to 
learn. • • 
In Worcester he had rarely laid eyes on a girl: his friends seemed always 
to have brothers, not sisters. Now he glimpses for the first time the sisters 
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of the English, so golden-blonde, so beautiful, that he cannot believe they 
are of this earth (136). 
The protagonist is ashamed of the school he goes to. He compares himself to 
the English boys and girls. The protagonist finds himself inferior. In his eyes, the 
English appear as angels in paradise. Their "hair", "skins" and "clothes" are perfect. 
Even the way they speak, in the eyes of the boy, suggest virtues and nobility. Being 
ashamed of himself, he looks up at the English. That he has "no aspiration to join 
� 
them" shows his diffidence in himself as an Afrikaner. But as an Afrikaner who 
，wishes to become English, he "watches and tries to leam[how the English behave] 
(136). His thought and behaviour reveals people's hope to rise from an inferior 
position. His admiration for English girls is as intense as that for English knights 
whom he shows in the previous passages. His compliment on English girls might 
sound a bit too exaggerated. It is because our subjectivity crosses with the boy's. The 
boy's feeling of inferior constitutes his self. According to Taylor, our significant 
others, those we care about, constitute and define ourselves. 
We are selves only in that certain issues matter for us. What I am as a self， 
my identity, is essentially defined by the way things have significance for 
me {Sources, 34). 
The modem self is different from the romantic self in a sense that the former is 
relational whereas the latter, autonomous. An autonomous self is self-centered 
meaning that the self sees himself as the centre of the being. He exists as a human 
being because he recognizes himself as one. He is in a subjective position to interpret 
life, the world and things around him. He is the subject; others are objects. But the 
relational self gains its meaning by the recognition of others. In each one-to-one 
relationship, the self is in the position of the object which requires the recognition of 
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significant others. Recognition given by innumerable one-to-one relationships makes 
up the relational self which is the form of existence of the modem self. 
Once we take views of others, their views become part of us and how they 
look at us becomes significant to us and thus, make up our selves. It is impossible for 
people to get out of this "webs of interlocution", according to Taylor. 
The adult narrator presents many "webs of interlocution" in the constitution of 
the boy's self. As Boyhood comes to the end, the vision given is not just a conflict 
� 
between the boy's self as a subject and that as an object but a combination of both. 
The boy enters adolescence. He begins to realize that it is impossible to see the world 
from his centred position. He discovers that his mother and father are subjects. He can 
see their subjectivities as reconciliation to all his pains and sufferings. 
Sometimes the gloom lifts. The sky, that usually sits tight and closed over 
his head, not so near that it can be touched but not that much further either, 
opens a slit, and for an interval he can see the world as it really is. He sees 
himself in his white shirt with rolled-up sleeves and the grey short trousers 
that he is on the point of outgrowing: not a child, not what a passer-by 
would call a child, too big for that now, too big to use that excuse, yet still 
as stupid and self-enclosed as a child: childish; dumb; ignorant; retarded. 
In a moment like this he can see his father and his mother too, from above, 
without anger: not as two grey and formless weights seating themselves on 
his shoulders, plotting his misery day and night, but as a man and a 
woman living dull and trouble-filled lives of their own. The sky opens, he 
sees the world as it is, then the sky closes and he is himself again, living 
the only story he will admit, the story oi\iimsQ\f {Boyhood, 160-61). 
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The protagonist begins to get out of his own world of misery and stops lamenting over 
his bad destiny by saying "I am just a child". Rather, as coming to manhood, the 
protagonist sees the same predicament that his father and mother face. He sees them 
as "a man and a woman living dull and trouble-filled lives of their own". He distances 
himself from them and comes up with a totally new vision. The parents are subjects 
just as the protagonist is. 
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Chapter Three 
The Relational Self in Youth 
Youth, is a kind of Joycean portrait of the artist as a young man. It depicts the 
yearning of the young man protagonist John to gain independence from parents and 
enter the realm of artists. 
� The self of John seems to be autonomous at face value. However, the autobiography 
does not end with an absolute independence from significant others. Rather, 
throughout the book the author stresses the importance of significant others in shaping 
the self of the protagonist. This section aims to reveal the pattern of how John sees 
himself and is seen in each of his relationships with significant others. This tendency 
is consistent to the relationality of the self in Boyhood. 
On the theme and structure of Bildungsroman, Joy Hooton has the following 
definition: 
The conventional pattern of the Bildungsroman is premised on separation 
and a narrative of failed relationships as the hero becomes more 
emphatically individuated; leaving the repressive atmosphere of home, the 
hero makes his solitary way to the city, where he will begin his education 
(Hooton, Stories, 92). 
Youth，in this sense, is a Bildungsroman. But it is different from canonical men's 
autobiographies which end with the protagonist's success to become autonomous. 
More intense than Boyhood, Youth projects a young man's yearning to autonomy 
from his mother and a country that he is ashamed of. John, the protagonist reveals his 
financial independence. Existentialist thought pervades in the text. A solitary hero 
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seeks for autonomy, which is typical among the heroes in Romantic autobiographies. 
The autonomous element in Youth, however, is just at face value. 
In Youth, John's self is not as autonomous as that of Stephen Dedalus in A 
Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916). Although John wants to leave his 
homeland South Africa in pursuit of art in Britain which is similar to Stephen's wish 
to get rid of his Irish identity, John's self is not autonomous. Both John and Stephen 
exist, in Taylor's term, "webs of interlocution". John, however, cannot to flee from 
� 
the webs whereas Stephen can. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, Stephen 
申 confesses: 
When the soul of a man is bom in this country there are nets flung at it to 
hold it back from flight. You talk to me of nationality, language, religion. I 
shall try to fly by those nets. 
Davin knocked the ashes from his pipe. 
-Too deep for me, Stevie, he said. But a man's country comes first. Ireland 
first, Stevie. You can be a poet or mystic after. 
-Do you know what Ireland is? asked Stephen with cold violence. Ireland is 
the old sow that eats her farrow (184). 
Stephen is resolute in putting Ireland behind. With "cold violence" he despises and is 
sick of Ireland. By leaving Ireland, Stephen thinks that he will be free in exploring art 
and life. Therefore, he decides to go into self exile. Stephen's self is autonomous and 
individualistic: 
-What you said, is it? Cranly asked. Yes，I remember it. To discover the 
mode of life or of art whereby your spirit could express itself in unfettered 
freedom.... 
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I will tell you what I will do and what I will not do. I will not serve that in 
which I no longer believe whether it call itself my home, my fatherland or 
my church: and I will try to express myself in some mode of life or art as 
freely as I can and as wholly as I can, using for my defence the only arms I 
allow myself to use - silence, exile, and cunning (222). 
In pursuit of freedom and art, Stephen is fearless. He sounds so absolute and sure of 
his yearning to be unbound from his fatherland that he is filled with resolution and 
fearlessness. On the path to autonomy, he believes that he is able to cope with any 
• difficulty and mistake ahead of him: 
But I [Stephen] will tell you [Cranly] also what I do not fear. I do not fear to 
be alone or to be spumed for another or to leave whatever I have to leave. 
And I am not afraid to make a mistake, even a great mistake, a lifelong 
mistake and perhaps as long as eternity too (223). 
Unlike Stephen, John's self is not autonomous. Although he longs to become an 
artist in England by leaving his homeland as Stephen does, John's self differs from 
Stephen's in a sense that John is torn between his South African and English identities. 
In other words, unlike Stephen, John cannot "fly by those nets" {Portrait, 184). These 
nets are what Taylor calls 'Vebs of interlocution". As John is still trapped in the 
“webs of interlocution", it is impossible for him to gain autonomy. 
At the beginning of the book, the protagonist John appears to be a typical 
autonomous hero who claims to be independent financially. 
All in all, when he adds up the monies, he is comfortably off -
comfortably enough to pay his rent and university fees and keep body and 
soul together and even save a little. He may only be nineteen but he is on 
his own feet, dependent on no one. (Youth, 2) 
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He is proving something: that each man is an island; that you don't need 
parents." (3) 
However, such independence is merely financial. Psychologically, the protagonist is 
not ready for independence. There is a conflict between financial independence and 
emotional dependence. Tough as he seems, John is still a child who is psychologically 
attached to his mother. 
There is something essential he lacks, some definition of feature. 
� 
Something of the baby still lingers in him. How long before he will cease 
» to be a baby? What will cure him of babyhood, make him into a man? (3) 
The motif of the baby resonates in latter part of the book. Whenever he faces a 
challenge that he is not able to solve, he relates it to the fact that he is still a baby in 
his mind. The autonomy to become a man, to attain manhood so as to become an artist 
is John's pursuit. The yearning to realize the autonomous self as an artist becomes a 
recurrent motif. 
For he will be an artist, that has long been settled. If for the time being he 
must be obscure and ridiculous, that is because it is the lot of the artist to 
suffer obscurity and ridicule until the day when he is revealed in his true 
powers and the scoffers and mockers fall silent (3). 
Now that he has his own income, he uses his independence to exclude his 
parents from his life. His mother is distressed by his coldness, he knows, 
the coldness with which he has responded to her love all his life. All his 
life she has wanted to coddle him; all his life he has been resisting (18). 
The idea of attaining independence from the mother appears again and again. The 
passage still contains desire for autonomy which reminds us of the mother's cage love 
in Boyhood. The mother-and-son relationship becomes an important line to trigger 
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and bring out the conventional motif of the autonomous self in autobiography. 
Despite the pursuit of autonomy, John sees his relational self with his mother after 
realizing that both of them are "prisoners" of life; they are trapped: 
But to his mother Saturday nights at the Masonic Hotel were apparently 
important, as important as being free to ride a horse or, when no horse was 
to be had, a bicycle. Dancing and horseriding stood for the life that had 
been hers before she married, before, in her version of her life-story, she 
became a prisoner ('I will not be a prisoner in this house!') (98) 
There is a deliberate aesthetic trace which echoes that in Boyhood. The 
mention of the horse and the bicycle echoes the mother's wish to obtain freedom. A 
sentence in Boyhood appears again- "I will not be a prisoner in this house!" The 
mother is, in a sense, an embodiment of John. They are similar that both of them want 
to get rid of the "trap" of family to pursue freedom. But far from getting away from 
the "trap", the mother sets a new trap for the son. Her cage love has put him in misery. 
The mother is an object in the family relationship. But in the relationship with her son, 
she becomes the subject who uses her love to "trap" him: 
That is the worst of it. That is the trap she has built, a trap he has not yet 
found a way out of. If he were to cut all ties, if he were not to write at all, 
she would draw the worst conclusion, the worst possible; and the very 
thought of the grief that would pierce her at that moment makes him want 
to block his ears and eyes. As long as she is alive he dare not die. As long 
as she is alive, therefore, his life is not his own. He may not be reckless 
with it (100). 
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In pursuit of autonomy, John has to fight against his being an object 
manipulated by the mother and yet, he cannot get out of his tie with his mother. His 
mother has become a significant other to him; she constitutes his self. To cut all the 
ties with his mother means to cut off part of his self because his mother has become 
part of him. Therefore, John is torn between his wish for autonomy and his relational 
self. He realizes "his life is not his own" because his mother constitutes his life and 
defines the meaning of his existence. The dialogic relationship between him and his 
� 
mother is presented. 
， Beside his mother, John sees his self from other women whose recognition is 
significant in their relationship. The emphasis on self autonomy in the beginning of 
the book pushes the aesthetic of autonomy to the zenith which contrasts to the latter 
part when John realizes he needs to be and is defined by significant others. 
John does not realize his self is relational until he gets Sarah pregnant: 
He[John] gets one of them pregnant. When she[Sarah] telephones to break 
the news, he is astonished, floored. How could he have got someone 
pregnant? In a certain sense he knows exactly how. An accident in haste, 
confusion, a mess of the kind that never finds a way into the novels he 
reads. Yet at the same time he cannot believe it. In his heart he does not 
feel himself to be more than eight years old, ten at the most. How can a 
child be a father? (32) 
Despite all his pursuit of autonomy, John is, psychologically speaking, a child. 
The incident of his getting Sarah pregnant reveals a boy's reaction to deal with an 
ethical matter: that of facing the coming of human being's offspring. The protagonist 
first is “astonished” and confused. He denies that he has made a mistake yet he 
completely knows how he did that. This shows that John is not mature enough to take 
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up responsibility and he finally admits that. Again, John's autonomous self and his 
thought of being an independent individual are challenged, Sarah behaves more 
maturely than John. In dealing with the "disaster" (33)，Sarah "does not hide away in 
her room pretending nothing is wrong" (33). On the contrary, she knows she has to 
solve the problem; she is going to get an abortion and has arranged everything. This 
has “put him[John] into shame" (33). Sarah is brave and independent. She walks into 
the clinic, gets the abortion and comes out alone. John, on the contrary, appears 
exactly as a coward: "Sitting in the car, he shudders. Who would guess that in an 
ordinary house like this, with hydrangeas in the garden and a plaster gnome, such 
horrors go on!" (34) 
In accompanying Sarah, John knows that "[a]s a nurse he is useless, worse 
than useless. What he is doing cannot in fact be called nursing. It is merely a penance, 
a stupid and ineffectual penance" (35). John is ashamed of himself because Sarah has 
“made no demands; she has even paid the abortionist herself. In fact, she has taught 
him a lesson in how to behave，，(35). He thinks of himself as an object and guesses 
what Sarah thinks about him as an object. Therefore, he "prays she will never tell the 
story to anyone" (35). He knows that he is merely a stupid and failed object. 
Walking away from his relationship with Sarah, he comes up with a sense of 
interconnectedness with the baby: 
His thoughts keep going to what was destroyed inside her — that pod of 
flesh, that rubbery manikin. He sees the little creature flushed down the 
toilet at the Woodstock house, tumbled through the maze of sewers, tossed 
out at last into the shallows, blinking in the sudden sun, struggling against 
the waves that will carry it out into the bay. He did not want it to live and 
now he does not want it to die. Yet even if he were to run down to the 
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beach, find it, save it from the sea, what would he do with it? Bring it 
home, keep it warm in cotton wool, try to get it to grow? How can he who 
is still a child bring up a child? (35) 
John no longer sees himself as an autonomous individual. Rather, he "sees" the 
baby's relation to him. He realizes that he is physiologically connected to the baby. 
John realizes his role as a father; he is the baby's father. His sentiment is no longer 
detached from it as that to his mother. "He did not want it to live and now he does not 
� 
want it to die" (35). He cares about the baby; the baby is valuable to him. The baby 
** constitutes his values and therefore is his significant other. In the abortion, John sees 
his self as a father in relation to the baby. However, he admits again that he is just a 
child, that how "can he who is still a child bring up a child?" (35) His yearning to be 
autonomous is challenged. He has to admit he exists only in relation to others. He 
feels guilty. In front of Sarah, he is no longer resolute and independent but guilty. We 
know from the adult narrator about the protagonist's guilt and fear of killing his 
offspring indirectly. The protagonist who screams for autonomy earlier in the book is 
now defeated. The innocence and frivolity of youth is revealed through this irony. 
The protagonist's relational self is also reflected in his mesmerization with 
European culture. The artists he identifies with are T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Pablo 
Picasso, Henry James, Ford Madox Ford from Continental-American artistic tradition. 
Behind these artists is the whole western tradition which is brought to South Africa 
through colonization. To identify with the European heritage implies an identification 
with the colonial power and a rejection to the Afrikaans. Such is the motive behind 
each relationship that John has. He manifests his preference for Europe by revealing 
his liking of European women. In each relationship, John stands as a subject on the 
one hand but an object on the other. While striving for an autonomous self detached 
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from his mother and South Africa, John is not able to get rid of the "webs of 
interlocution" which traps him from being seen as an object. In each of his affairs 
with women, we can see his fascination for Europe. John is attracted to Jacqueline's 
English background to a certain extent. "Elinor and her twin sister[Jacqueline] were 
bom in England; they were brought to South Africa at the age of fifteen, after the War 
(4)". In his affair with Jacqueline, who is ten years older, John manifests his wish to 
become mature. And also because she is older, he becomes aware of whether or not 
he is mature enough. "He has not made love to an older woman before. What if he is 
„ not up to standard?" (5) John is insecure about his self. He hopes Jacqueline can see 
his artistic self which he is proud of. In this sense, he cannot obtain autonomy because 
he needs others' recognition to define himself. Only his artist self is he concerned 
about: "Is it credible that in the course of a casual conversation she detected the secret 
flame burning in him, the flame that marks him as an artist?" (5) 
Though he does not love Jacqueline, John finds it a good idea to sleep with her 
in order to leam about European culture because she has had contacts with European 
men. John's wish reflects that his obsession with European charisma has come to an 
almost ridiculous degree. He thinks that, by having body contact with women of 
European origin directly or indirectly, he will become part of European culture. 
Therefore, his self is highly defined by recognition from others, in this case, European 
others: 
Here he is sharing a flat with a woman ten years older than he, a woman of 
experience who, during her stint at Guy's Hospital, slept (she says) with 
Englishmen, Frenchmen, Italians, even a Persian. If he cannot claim to be 
loved for himself, at least he has been given a chance to broaden his 
education in the realm of the erotic (8). 
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John's European mesmerization manifested in his preference for European 
women or women with European contact comes mainly from his rejection of his 
South African identity. As a white South African, he is sandwiched between the 
blacks and the English. His yearning for England reflects his wish to ascend to the 
English class. But at the same time, he is aware of his superiority to blacks. He 
identifies himself with the English whereas the English do not recognize him. He 
knows that he is superior to and excluded from the blacks in South Africa because he 
is white. He shows his sympathy for the blacks and his reflections upon apartheid. 
Not always a failure as a white South African, John stands in the eternal gap 
between whites and blacks in South Africa. He is an outsider. He ponders over the 
fact why the black milkman is not followed by any thief who would steal the milk he 
delivers. John tries to think into the existence of the blacks and thus realizes his self in 
relation to the blacks: 
The fact that stealing it is too easy? Are there standards of conduct even 
among thieves? Or do thieves take pity on milkmen, who are for the most 
part young and black and powerless? 
He[John] would like to believe this last explanation. He would like to 
believe there is enough pity in the air for black people and their lot, 
enough of a desire to deal honourably with them, to make up for the 
cruelty of the laws. But he knows it is not so. Between black and white 
there is a gulf fixed. Deeper than pity, deeper than honourable dealings, 
deeper even than goodwill, lies an awareness on both sides that people like 
Paul and himself, with their pianos and violins, are here on this earth, the 
earth of South Africa, on the shakiest of pretexts... In fact, from Africans 
in general, even from Coloured people, he feels a curious, amused 
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tenderness emanating: a sense that he must be a simpleton, in need of 
protection, if he imagines he can get by on the basis of straight looks and 
honourable dealings when the ground beneath his feet is soaked with 
blood and the vast backward depth of history rings with shouts of anger 
(17). 
John thinks himself into the existence of the milkman. The relationship 
between him and the milkman is that between two races which stand on two unequal 
� 
grounds. In reflection John realizes part of his self is defined by the blacks since 
I between black and white there is a "gulf fixed. In relation to the blacks, he is a white 
with superiority. Therefore, he is to blame for the suffering and pain of black to a 
certain extent. The protagonist, as a white in South Africa, is no longer a victim in 
discrimination. Rather, he is aware of his superiority as a white. He wonders why the 
black milkman can still "smile so gently as he[milkman] watches the two of 
them[John and Paul] drink the milk he has given them" (17). John is actually 
comparing his own life to the milkman's. Both of them are South Africans. But why 
is John so discontented with the place and wants to leave it so badly whereas the 
milkman seems to be happy with his lot? John knows that he is privileged in South 
Africa, as a white: there is a “gulf，between black and white. The motif as an outsider 
resonates here. Among the English, John is an outsider due to his Afrikaans origin. 
Among the black, he is also an outsider too due to his white skin which suggests 
racial superiority under apartheid. The yearning for autonomy lowers its volume here. 
John discovers that his own self is not transcendent and independent from others. He 
is a white South African. Such an identity is revealed and meaningful in the context of 
the milkman. In front of the milkman, John realizes that he is a white which entails a 
whole sphere of racial discrimination imposed on him. John is no longer autonomous. 
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The milkman reminds him of his history and roots and stands as a subject who 
inspires John to think about his position in the realm of apartheid. 
As a white South African under apartheid, John deeply senses his otherness 
among the dominating English and the discriminated blacks. One day when he is 
tutoring English students in the university, the blacks are striking against the police on 
campus. In the class he suddenly sees his Afrikaans self among the English students 
who, in the eyes of John, do not belong to the land of South Africa. 
� 
Three hundred years of history, three hundred years of Christian 
事 civilization at the tip of Africa, said the politicians in their speeches: to the 
Lord let us give thanks. Now, before his eyes, the Lord is withdrawing his 
protective hand. In the shadow of the mountain he is watching history 
being unmade (39). 
Christian civilization in South Africa represents the conquest of European powers in 
the form of colonialism. The Lord becomes distant from South Africa which in a 
sense means Christian civilization might just be a civilization to Europeans. The 
theme of alienation is presented. South Africans are deserted by the Lord. As a South 
African, John has a feeling of being abandoned like an orphan. As the Lord is leaving 
South Africa, John becomes as homeless as his other folks. He shows an inclination 
towards identifying with South Africans. 
The protagonist further projects a distance between him and the English 
students. He detaches from them and realizes he, despite white, is South African. 
In the hush around him, among these neat, well-dressed products of 
Rondebosch Boys High School and the Diocesan College, these youths 
who half an hour ago were busy calculating angles of vector and dreaming 
of careers as civil engineers, he can feel the same shock of dismay. They 
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were expecting to enjoy a show, to snicker at a procession of garden boys, 
not to behold this grim host. The afternoon is ruined for them; all they 
want now is to go home, have a Coke and a sandwich, forget what has 
passed (39). 
The youths do not belong to South Africa. Towards the protest their attitude is 
detached. They are simply onlookers with no sense of belonging to South Africa. 
Their sentiment does not belong to John's. We see the thoughts and behaviour of the 
� 
English from John's perspective. There is a "gulf between the English and John 
which is similar to that between white and black in South Africa. John is neither 
English nor black. He is completely alienated, an outsider. To the protest in South 
Africa: 
He is no different. Will the ships still be sailing tomorrow? 一 that is his 
one thought. I must get out before it is too late! (39) 
John is forced to flee, like a victim. Among the blacks in South Africa, John 
finds his alienated self as a white. He is defined not by himself but others. He is a 
white in relation to the blacks who stand against him. He has to go in exile. "But how 
can he flee without taking his degree? It would be like departing on a long journey, a 
life's journey, with no clothes, no money, no (the comparison comes more reluctantly) 
weapon" (40). In South Africa he is the enemy of black. In London, he is not 
welcomed by the English. The IBM interviewer asks him "whether he has left South 
Africa for good" (44)，suspecting that he came to London to escape from South Africa. 
John's salary as an IBM programmer is the same as that of a trainee station foreman. 
He suffers discrimination from the English to whom he is merely an outsider. 
The sense of alienation is further revealed. In his pursuit of autonomy, John 
faces a series of incidents that remind him of the fact that his self is to be defined by 
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others. If he had obtained his autonomy, he would not have felt miserable in London 
with a job and salary. In IBM, he lacks friendship. No matter how autonomous he 
wants to be, he needs the web of relationships to exist; he needs friends. By being 
important to a person in a friendship, John can know his importance and value. 
Without significant others, John's self is incomplete; he cannot see his self that only 
his friend can see. 
He is in England, in London; he has a job, a proper job, better than mere 
� 
teaching, for which he is being paid a salary. He has escaped South Africa. 
Everything is going well, he has attained his first goal, he ought to be 
happy. In fact, as the weeks pass, he finds himself more and more 
miserable. He has attacks of panic, which he beats off with 
difficulty.. .Under the shadowless glare of the neon lighting, he feels his 
very soul to be under attack. The building, a featureless block of concrete 
and glass, seems to give off a gas, odourless, colourless, that finds its way 
into his blood and numbs him. IBM, he can swear, is killing him, turning 
him into a zombie (47). 
John begins to realize that he cannot get rid of the force of circumstances. He 
is not able to transcend and become autonomous. He is able to "escape" South Africa 
and settles down in London. But he is not able to fight against the helplessness and 
loneliness that IBM gives him. In the office, he appears as an object surrounded by 
the building and tedious office work. 
In the abyss of despair, John's child self appears. There appears a pattern that 
when John faces a challenge, his child self appears; he keeps saying that he is a still a 
child in order to deny the fact that he fails. When Sarah, is pregnant and he does not 
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know what to do, he says he is still a child: "How can a child be a father?" (32) Now, 
when he is in London, failing to attain his goal as a poet but spending his time 
summing up numbers as a computer programmer, his child self appears again: 
"Deeper than that he is still a child, ignorant of his place in the world, frightened, 
indecisive. What is he doing in this huge, cold city where merely to stay alive means 
holding tight all the time, trying not to fall?" (56-57) His child self appears whenever 
his ambition to gain autonomy fails. The adult narrator keeps reminding us of the fact 
� 
that in the pursuit of autonomy in the vastness of life, the protagonist is not able to get 
out of the force of circumstances that his power to control his life is limited and that 
he can be as helpless as a child at any time. 
But we are concerned about one fact: that John is displaced and disoriented. 
He has written a story which is set in South Africa. But he does not want to publish it 
because: 
The English will not understand it. For the beach in the story they will 
summon up an English idea of a beach, a few pebbles lapped by wavelets. 
They will not see a dazzling space of sand at the foot of rocky cliffs 
pounded by breakers with gulls and cormorants screaming overhead as 
they battle for wind (62). 
The protagonist can see himself in relation to the English. He is no more than 
a white South African in the eyes of the English. He belongs to South Africa whereas 
the English, to England. In reading the same story, the protagonist projects a totally 
different picture from the English. Such a difference sets the English apart from him 
forever because of their differences in recognition. His self includes what the English 
see him as. Thus, his self is a relational one. 
His subjective admission of his alienation in England further supports this 
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argument. 
He does not as yet know England well enough to do England in prose. He 
is not even sure he can do the parts of London he is familiar with, the 
London of crowds trudging to work, of cold and rain, of bedsitters with 
curtainless windows and forty-watt bulbs.. .He may have his own vision of 
London, but there is nothing unique to that vision. If it has a certain 
intensity, that is only because it is narrow, and it is narrow because it is 
ignorant of everything outside itself (63). 
There is ambivalence in his self. He cannot stand South Africa so he escapes. 
But in London, he finds that he does belong to English society. His incapacity to write 
about London in prose reveals his outsideness. Therefore, he has to admit that he has 
not “mastered London" (63). In fact, "[i]f there is any mastering going on, it is 
London mastering him" (63). He is merely an object in relation to London. 
The adult narrator's juxtaposition of John with Caroline, a significant other of 
the protagonist, further reveals John's obsession with European culture and his 
alienated being from English society. Unlike Jacqueline, Caroline serves as a 
competitor to John as they both come from South Africa and settle in London. They 
strive for autonomy in different ways. Caroline, for a career onstage; John, for that of 
a poet. From Caroline, John sees his inadequacy. 
He is impressed by her, by her energy and enterprise. A few weeks in 
London and she has already found her feet. She has a job; her CV has gone 
out to all the theatrical agents; and she has a flat in a fashionable quarter, 
which she shares with three English girls (69). 
John's relationship with Caroline is no more than a sexual one. Yet he is not 
autonomous in the relationship. He is totally on a passive side dogging after Caroline. 
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He sees himself as a failure and begins to think over their relationship: 
Is he passionate about Caroline? He would not have imagined so. In the 
time they were apart he barely gave her a thought. Why then this docility 
on his part, this abjectness? Does he want to be made unhappy? Is that 
what unhappiness has become for him: a drug he cannot do without? (70) 
John's indifference to Caroline comes mainly from the fact that Caroline is not 
European but South African. He compares Caroline with European women and finds 
it a pity that she is not one of them. But he needs Caroline to assert the value of 
existence. Caroline is, ‘‘for the present, all he has". She means to John in the sense 
that her belonging to him appears as something that asserts his existence. He finds 
himself valuable when a woman values him. His self value is built upon the 
recognition from significant others, in this case, Caroline. 
They still make love, but it is not as it was before. Caroline's mind is 
elsewhere. Worse than that: with his glooms and his sulks he is fast 
becoming a burden to her, he can feel that. If he had any sense he would 
break off the affair right now, clear out. But he does not. Caroline may not 
be the mysterious, dark-eyed beloved he came to Europe for，she may be 
nothing but a girl from Cape Town from a background as humdrum as his 
own, but she is, for the present, all he has (70). 
In his relationship with Caroline, John does not only see himself from his 
perspective but is seen by Caroline, who reminds him of his ethnic inferiority as a 
South African in London. 
Once they are together, however, she does not conceal her impatience with 
him. How can he come all the way to London, she says, and then spend his 
days adding up numbers on a machine?...He does not understand why 
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Caroline does not break off with him, the clerk boyfriend. Creeping home 
in the early morning dark after a night with her, he can only pray she will 
not get in touch with him again (77-78). 
Seeing Caroline do well in London, John cannot conceal his confusion. He 
even sees Laurence Olivier, who "has promised her a part in an as yet unspecified 
play" (78)，a potential competitor. He knows that Caroline does not adore him. He 
cares if Caroline would 'mention that there is a rival in the background, a clerk who 
works for an adding machine company and lives in a room off the Archway Road 
where he sometimes writes verses?" (78) John sees his self as a colonial and artist in 
relation to Caroline. 
The air of being a failure goes on in Youth in John's relationship with other 
women. His wish to have attention of the English girls reveals his yearning to be 
recognized as English: 
In England girls pay no attention to him, perhaps because there still lingers 
about his person an air of colonial gaucherie, perhaps simply because his 
clothes are not right.. .In the trains the eyes of girls slide over him or glaze 
with disdain (71). 
John is comparing himself with the Englishmen. He can see himself as an object from 
the eyes of the English girls. Feeling inferior, he thinks of putting himself in disguise 
by dressing like the Englishmen: "The sensible thing would be to buy himself an 
outfit like theirs and wear it at weekends" (71). But he “cannot do it; it would be like 
giving himself up to a charade, an act" (72). 
John's obsession with European girls shows his fascination about European 
culture. He admires European culture and denies his South African colonial origin. 
John relates the lovemaking of Swedes and that of Italians to their cultural and 
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climatic conditions. He sees them as representations of a certain culture which he 
admires from an inferior position. The girls in London are exotic to him in the sense 
that they satisfy his wish to take part in the European culture. He wishes to sleep with 
them. By sleeping with them he thinks he can share European charisma and the status 
it will grant him. However, he feels inferior and is intimidated, not as a man but a 
male colonial. No longer as assertive as he used to be, John sees, in the eyes of the 
European girls, himself as an object from the colony. He begins to worry about his 
� 
charm, not as a male, but male colonial. He is not sure whether or not he can impress, 
, n o t just a girl, but “a girl from Europe" (72). His wish to court a girl is no longer just 
for sex but power and superiority. He wonders if he can win, from the inferior 
position as a colonial, a girl from a dominating power. His self, in this sense, is related 
to power struggles between the colonizing and the colonized. He sees himself as a 
poet but the European girls cannot see that. They only see him as a colonial. The adult 
narrator reveals two ways of looking in the relationship between John and the 
European girls. 
From this mesmerization of European charisma and "a duty to life at its 
fullest" as an artist, John embarks on his way to merging with Europe by having sex 
with an English girl from King's College who "dresses with appropriate severity in 
dark skirt and black stockings" (73). She does not seem to fit into John's standard of 
those "mysterious" European girls. But as he undresses her, he "marvels at the 
shapeliness of her naked body, the ivory whiteness of her skin" (73). The girl's 
"whiteness" amazes John because he comes from South Africa, where skin colour is a 
measurement of racial superiority. The girl's ivory white skin functions as a sign that 
represents superiority and cilivilization of Europe as opposed to South African 
barbarism. The English girl represents the whole English race. John cannot help 
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asking "Are all Englishwomen as beautiful when their clothes are off, he wonders?" 
(73) 
But he fails to be recognized by the English girl as part of European 
civilization: 
Naked they lie in each other's arms, but there is no warmth between them; 
and warmth, it becomes clear, will not grow. At last the girl withdraws, 
folds her arms across her breasts, pushes his hands away，shakes her head 
� 
mutely (73). 
The English girl refuses John, the South African. There is no "warmth" 
between them. In South Africa，that love does not flourish between Jacqueline and 
John is due to the fact that Jacqueline is not an artist. Therefore, she cannot 
understand the inner solitude that an artist needs. But in London, with an English 
female poet, John is not able to have love flourish between them. 
John's self is not autonomous anymore but relational. His yearning to be 
recognized by others, especially European girls, becomes stronger and stronger. But 
he has “no further luck with English girls. There are English girls enough at IBM, 
secretaries and punch operators, and opportunities to chat to them" (74). Obviously, 
he has a special interest in English girls. But he notices that from the English girls' 
perspectives, he is no more than a South African. From the girls he "feels a certain 
resistance, as if they are not sure who he is, what his motives might be, what he is 
doing in their country" (74). John has a sense of alienation because the English girls 
do not know what he is doing in "their" country. The girls do not recognize him as 
English or a member of English culture. John is an outsider among the Englishmen 
who "flirt with them[the English girls] in a jolly, coaxing English way" (74). The 
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English girls "respond to being flirted with" (74) because the Englishmen are on the 
same ethnic position with the English girls. 
Human beings' ethnic identification, to the protagonist, works no different from 
animals'. The girls at IBM "have a cosy sensuality of their own, the sensuality of 
animals brought up together in the same steamy den, familiar with each other's body 
habits" (82). However detached the English girls may be, John cannot help being 
attracted: "Though they cannot compete in glamour with the Swedes and Italians, he 
� 
is attracted to these English girls, to their equality and humorousness" (82). He would 
• like to know an English girl Rhoda better but does not know how because she 
"belongs to a foreign tribe. The barriers he would have to work his way past, to say 
nothing of the conventions of tribal courtship, baffle and dishearten him" (82). 
Turned down by English culture, John turns his attention to French culture: 
His highest aspiration, higher than for an English girlfriend, higher even 
than for a Swede or an Italian, is to have a French girl. If he has a 
passionate affair with a French girl he would be touched and improved, he 
is sure, by the grace of the French language, the subtlety of French thought 
(74). 
John's mesmerization on the French culture is manifested in earlier passages. 
Among "three places in the world where life can be lived at its fullest intensity: 
London, Paris, perhaps Vienna. Paris comes first: city of love, city of art" (41). His 
yearning to live in Paris is consistent with his obsession with French girls. His longing 
to be recognized by French culture is revealed from his desire to have an affair with a 
French girl. But he can see that in the eyes of French girls, like the English girls, he is 
just an inferior colonial: 
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But why should a French girl, any more than an English girl, deign to 
speak to him? And anyway, he has not so much as laid eyes on a French 
girl in London. The French have France, after all, the most beautiful 
country in the world. Why should they come to chilly England to look 
after the natives' babies? (74) 
So far we have seen how John's self works in relation to others. From the use 
of dialogism，the adult narrator reveals two perspectives in each relationship of an 
� 
event. Behind John's wish to be recognized by European culture is a decision to 
abandon his Afrikaans origin. He is ashamed of the inferiority and barbarism 
Afrikaans culture suggests. 
The language for which he a real feeling, however, is German.. .he reads 
German poetry and follows it well enough. He approves of the way in 
which every syllable in German is given its due weight. With the ghost of 
Afrikaans still in his ears, he is at home in the syntax. In fact, he takes 
pleasures in the length of German sentences, in the complex pileup of 
verbs at the end. There are times, reading German, when he forgets he is in 
a foreign language (75-76). 
John is ambivalent about his cultural identity. He identifies with English 
culture and the English language because he identifies with the whole European 
culture. The similarity of German to Afrikaans reminds him of Afrikaans, his native 
language in which he is comfortable. Through German, he obtains a secure feeling 
that Afrikaans gives him. Afrikaans gives him a feeling of his home which soothes his 
sense of alienation. German reminds him of his inner Afrikaans identity which he is 
ashamed of，and so, strongly denies. 
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Working in "an IBM office in London" (83) in the year 1962, John "has joined 
the TSR 一 2 project, become part of the British defence effort; he has furthered British 
plans to bomb Moscow" (83). On the one hand, as a colonial discriminated against by 
the English, John sees no way to help the English do all the evil with no reward; on 
the other hand, he cannot help his preference for the Russians stemming from his 
childhood. But he wonders, from the perspective of the Russians, if he would be 
recognized as an ally of them: 
On the one hand, he would like to do his bit to save Russia from being 
* bombed. On the other, has he a moral right to enjoy British hospitality 
while sabotaging their air force? And anyhow, how would the Russians 
ever get to know that an obscure sympathizer in an IBM office in London 
had won them a few days' breathing-space in the Cold War? (83) 
From neither side would John be recognized. He is an outsider in the Cold 
War. He belongs to nowhere not because he would not choose but because he would 
not be chosen. In the Cold War he sees his predicament as an outcast, and exiled. He 
is enraged, having "escaped the Afrikaners who want to press-gang him into their 
army and the blacks who want to drive him into the sea, to find himself on an island 
that is shortly to be turned to cinders!" (85) He sees no way out and so expresses the 
anger and helplessness that people face under the force of circumstance: 
What kind of world is this in which he lives? Where can one turn to be free 
of the fury of politics? Only Sweden seems to be above the fray. Should he 
throw up everything and catch to next boat to Stockholm? Does one have 
to speak Swedish to get into Sweden? Does Sweden need computer 
programmers? Does Sweden even have computers? (85) 
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John exists totally as a homeless orphan. He is in a diaspora. He clearly sees 
himself as an orphan in the eyes of the British. He knows that the British "have had 
enough of the Boers and of Boer-led South Africa, a colony that has always been 
more trouble than it has been worth" (86-87). John, conscious of his cultural identity 
as a Boer, thinks the British "would be content if South Africa would quietly vanish 
over the horizon. They certainly do not want forlorn South African whites cluttering 
their doorstep like orphans in search of parents" (87). 
� 
John denies his Afrikaans origin. He is ashamed of it because it suggests 
inferiority in the society he grew up in. The English are the dominating race and 
suggest superiority. This kind of complex is typical among colonials. John wants to 
join the English but his surname shuts him out of the English sphere. 
How long will he have to live in England before it is allowed that he has 
become the real thing, become English? Will getting a British passport be 
enough, or does an odd-sounding foreign name mean he will be shut out 
for ever? And ‘becoming English' 一 what does that mean anyhow? 
England is the home of two nations: he will have to choose between them, 
choose whether to be middle-class English or working-class English (103). 
He knows that England is a hierarchical society. Therefore, his question is 
more than a question of choosing a race that he identifies with but a class as well. To 
detach from South Africa and identify with the English does not only refer to a 
change of identity but also that of a class. His self has become more and more 
dialogical. When he self-analyses all the consequences and trade-off of becoming 
English, he is actually reflecting on his relations to others. Without the others, John's 
outsideness would not appear. He needs others to get rid of him in order to form his 
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outsideness. Apart from defining himself in relation to the English middle-class and 
working-class, John positions himself by juxtaposing himself with people from other 
nations. 
There are other South Africans in London, thousands of them, if he is to 
believe report. There are Canadians too, Australians, New Zealanders, 
even Americans. But these people are not immigrants, are not here to settle, 
to become English. They have come to have fun or to study or to earn 
� 
some money before going on a tour of Europe. When they have had 
enough of the Old World they will go home and take up their real lives. 
There are Europeans in London as well, not only language students but 
refugees from the Eastern Bloc and, further back, from Nazi Germany. But 
their situation is different from his. He is not a refugee; or rather, a claim 
on his part to be a refugee will get him nowhere in the Home Office. Who 
is oppressing you, the Home Office will say? From what you are fleeing? 
From boredom, he will reply. From philistinism. From atrophy of the 
moral life. From shame. Where will such a plea get him? (104) 
John cannot situate his place. If being white suggests racial superiority, why 
can he not be on the same feet with the English? There are other whites in England. 
Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders, Americans and John are all whites. But John 
is different from them in the sense that he is homeless. He has left his home in South 
Africa and comes to London to start a new life. He does not come to London for fun. 
He is not able to do so. He is an immigrant, but not a refugee. Unlike Jews under Nazi, 
John comes to London not entirely because of political reasons. He comes to look for 
inspiration and circumstances for him to become a poet. In this sense, he is not forced 
to leave or rejected by his nation. Rather, he chooses to leave it. Nobody oppresses 
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him. Therefore, he is not among the refugees in London. He is sandwiched between 
two identities: the superior English and the inferior refugees. 
John sees his ambivalent self in relation to others. He is thrown in a dialogical 
net. He is not able to define himself but to be defined in relation to others. He is an 
inferior colonial in relation to the English. He is an immigrant in relation to other 
white foreigners who come to London for flin. He is not that inferior in relation to the 
refugees in London. He realizes his outsideness one day he sees a notice about 
� 
discrimination against the coloured in London: 
NO COLOURED say notices in the windows of lodging-houses. Month by 
month the government tightens its immigration laws. West Indians are 
halted at the dockside in Liverpool, detained until they grow desperate, 
then shipped back to where they came from. If he is not made to feel as 
nakedly unwelcome as they are, it can only be because of his protective 
coloration: his Moss Brothers suit, his pale skin (104). 
From seeing the coloured being prevented from lodging in London, John sees 
his inferior position as a South African. What makes him feel more ashamed is that he 
pretends to be English so that he can get rid of being noticed as a South African. He is 
not able to define himself because he is doomed to be defined by others. Therefore, he 
is full of ambivalences: 
South Africa is a wound within him. How much longer before the wound 
stops bleeding? How much longer will he have to grit his teeth and endure 
before he is able to say, 'Once upon a time I used to live in South Africa 
but now I live in England'? (116) 
John is not able to be recognized by the English as an English no matter how 
much he wishes to be. Such brings a conflict between the wish and the reality. Until 
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here, the book does not stress John's desire for autonomy. Rather, it shows gradually 
that John's self is impossible to detach from others' perspectives. And their 
perspectives have become the forces that shape and model John's self. Every time he 
struggles between becoming English and being South African, he is thinking if he is 
able to become English because to become English requires others to recognize him. 
When to be recognized as English is important to John, John's self is relational but 
not autonomous. He cares about the recognition of others. Such recognition makes the 
� 
possibility of having an autonomous self impossible. 
Even in the relationship with a five-year-old girl Fiona, when John is ashamed 
of his South African self when realizing it. He rejects his Afrikaans origin and 
emphasizes his being different from Afrikaners, and that he is an independent person, 
a subject. 
There are Afrikaners 一 big-bellied, red-nosed men all over Africa: in 
Rhodesia, in Angola, in Kenya, certainly in Malawi. Is there anything he 
can do to make her understand that he is not one of them, that he has quit 
South Africa, is to you, it is yours to do with as you wish: if he said that to 
her, out of the blue, across the kitchen table, would she change her mind 
about him? (121) 
He compares himself with other Afrikaners whom he despises. He wants to 
make Fiona know that he is different from them. But he knows that in the eyes of 
Fiona, he is just one of the Afrikaners, a collective concept as an object. The original 
of his self as an individual comes into conflict with his self as a collective idea in 
other people's eyes. John reveals that he values how other people see him and their 
seeing him becomes part of John's self. He cares about how others see him. What 
Fiona sees John influences John's view on himself. Therefore, his self is relational. 
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John's care about other's perspectives is also revealed in his relationship with 
Mr Merrington, Fiona's father. Mr Memngton is English whose judgement on John 
represents the collective idea of the English towards South Africans. Although Mr 
Memngton belongs to the working class which John does not identify with, John still 
cares about his words and sees his self through the eyes of Mr Memngton. When John 
introduces himself, Mr Memngton replies: 
'Ah, yes', says the man, 'the South African. I had forgotten. Let me 
� 
introduce myself. Richard Memngton. I used to be lord of the manor 
取 here."... 
'And how long do you plan to be here?' says the man. 
‘Just till the end of the month.' 
'No, I mean how long in this country?' 
'Oh, indefinitely. I've left South Africa.' 
'Things pretty bad there, are they?' 
'Yes.， 
'Even for whites?' 
How does one respond to a question like that? If you don 't want to perish 
of shame? If you want to escape the cataclysm to come? Why do big words 
sound so out of place in this country? (123-124) 
John subjectively thinks that he has left South Africa. It is his decision to leave 
his country and come to England, which he identifies with. But Mr Memngton cannot 
see John's yearning for English and European culture. He simply sees John as a South 
African, one of those many South Africans in London who comes to England for 
good. In Mr Memngton's perspective, John is a collective concept. He is not only an 
object to Mr Memngton but also represents a collective concept; John is a South 
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African but not an independent person, an individual. John's identity to Mr 
Memngton is all but a white South African but not John as an individual. John has no 
essence. Part of his existence is defined by others. To make the matter worse, John is 
not black who suffers from extreme discrimination in South Africa. To Mr 
Merrington, despite inferior, John should not suffer from discrimination since he is a 
white. The motif of being out of place appears again. To Mr Merrington, John might 
just be the white who dominate the blacks in South Africa. Paradoxically, also as a 
� 
white, Mr Memngton does not recognize John as an equal but a colonial. 
John's disgust for his Afrikaans origin is presented through his relationship 
with Marianne. With his coloration as disguise, John thinks he has become part of 
English culture. As he is ashamed of his Afrikaans origin, he does not want to speak 
Afrikaans, his family language. But he feels warm and free in his family language. 
That is why every time he speaks Afrikaans reluctantly, he suddenly feels free. The 
motif of being brought home by a language appears before. When he reads German, 
he feels like home. Anything about Afrikaans makes him feel at home because it is 
where he is from. What pains him is his thought that Afrikaans culture is inferior and 
English is superior and civilized. John speaks English even with his cousin from 
South Africa. 
For a while they all speak English, then he relents and switches to the 
language of the family, to Afrikaans. Though it is years since he spoke 
Afrikaans, he can feel himself relax at once as though sliding into a warm 
bath (127). 
Nor does she care if people hear her speak Afrikaans. As for him, he 
would prefer it if she lowered her voice. Speaking Afrikaans in this 
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country, he wants to tell her, is like speaking Nazi, if there were such a 
language (127). 
Marianne is the opposite of John. She shows no preference for English culture. 
She is a typical Afrikaans woman, short and plump and not as fashionable as London 
girls. In the relationship with Marianne, John sees himself as a person who rejects 
Afrikaans culture. To him, speaking Afrikaans is evil. Marianne is like John's other 
self. His perspective on Marianne is like that of the English to him. Marianne appears 
� 
as rude and uncivilized. This is the image of Afrikaners and South Africans in the 
• eyes of the English. John looks at her from the perspective of how others look at 
himself. 
But he is still attached to South Africa because Afrikaans is a language of 
intimacy. It is the initial force that defines him as a person. English is a language of 
the public which gives him social assertions and superiority. As he grows up, he 
wants social recognition. Therefore, he decides to abandon his Afrikaans origin in the 
pursuit of English. But so far from his rejection from the English, he realizes that he 
fails to be recognized by the English and the South African. He belongs to none of 
them and thus is rootless. 
He belongs to two worlds tightly sealed from each other. In the world of 
South Africa, he is no more than a ghost, a wisp of smoke fast dwindling 
away, soon to have vanished for good. As for London, he is as good as 
unknown here (131). 
As alienation goes on, John discovers his otherness more and more. He begins to 
reflect his initial resoluteness to be independent. The voice of the autonomous self 
fades as he appears to be the women's other. 
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/ am hard enough on myself, he tells himself： I do not need the help of 
others. It is a sophistry he falls back on time and again to block his ears to 
criticism: he learned its usefulness when Jacqueline, from the perspective 
of a woman of thirty, gave him her opinion of him as a lover. Now, as 
soon as an affair begins to run out of steam, he withdraws. He abominates 
scenes, angry outbursts, home truths ('Do you want to know the truth 
about yourself?，)，and does all in his power to evade them. What is truth 
� 
anyway? If he is a mystery to himself, how can he be anything but a 
mystery to others? There is a pact he is ready to offer women in his life: if 
they will treat him as a mystery, he will treat them as a closed book (132-
133). 
He appears to be an object when reflecting on Jacqueline's words. In front of 
Jacqueline, an experienced, worldly-wise and older woman, John appears as a 
defeated young man, childish and ignorant. He is just a "mystery to others". If other 
women "treat him as a mystery", he will, in return, "treat them as a closed book". We 
have two perspectives: that of other women and that of John. John's self is made up of 
his position as a subject as well as that as an object. The dialogic relation between he 
and other women is further revealed. 
John's relation with England proves that his self is more than autonomous. He 
exists as a South African expatriate in England who wishes to emerge totally into 
English culture by abandoning his South African identity. But between English and 
him there is an ethnic as well as cultural gap. They see each other as the other. John's 
ambivalent attitude towards patriotism reveals the relation of otherness between him 
and the English. He thinks: 
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Patriotism: is that what is beginning to afflict him? Is he proving himself 
unable to live without a country? Having shaken the dust of the ugly new 
South Africa from his feet, is he yearning for the South Africa of the old 
days, when Eden was still possible? Do theses Englishmen around him feel 
the same tug at the heartstrings when there is mention of Rydal Mount or 
Baker Street in a book? He doubts it. This country, this city, are by now 
wrapped in centuries of words. Englishmen do not find it at all strange to 
� 
be walking in the footsteps of Chaucer or Tom Jones (137). 
In the eyes of John, the English exist as the other who do not share with him the same 
vision and understanding of South Africa. John demonstrates an orphan consciousness. 
He does not approve of the new South Africa. In his mind, his mother country is dead. 
Therefore, he has to escape South Africa for England in order to find a place which 
gives him national pride and a feeling of his home. Unlike South Africa, England is a 
conscious choice he makes. Although John was not able to choose South Africa as his 
country since he was bom South African, the country has already become part of him. 
That part of his self makes up his patriotism which distinguishes him from the English. 
Such is a distance from cultural heritage and tradition. John and the English share 
different cultural heritages. Being separated by the gap, when the English mention 
South Africa in their travel writing, John has a different understanding upon the same 
issue. He has a "tug at heartstrings" when seeing his country mentioned by the 
English, i.e. the other. That is why he wonders if the Englishmen would “feel the 
same" when places of England were mentioned in a book. John distances himself 
from the English and sees the self-other relation between them. His alienated self is 
apparent when he mentions that "Englishmen do not find it at all strange to. be 
walking in the footsteps of Chaucer or Tom Jones" (137). Englishmen do not find it 
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strange but he does since no matter how "English" he thinks he is, deep in his heart, 
his sensibility belongs to South Africa. In the above passage, John sees the English as 
the other and at the same time, sees himself as the other of the English. 
John's orphan consciousness and sense of homelessness is further revealed in 
the passage when he strolls off the streets of London: 
Briefcase in hand, he strolls out of the British Museum and joins the crowd 
passing down Great Russell Street: thousands of souls, not one of whom 
� 
cares a fig what he thinks of Ford Madox Ford or anything else. When he 
等 first arrived in London he used to stare boldly into the faces of these 
passers-by, searching out the unique essence of each. Look, I am looking 
at you! he was saying. But bold stares got him nowhere in the city where, 
he soon discovered, neither men nor women met his gaze but, on the 
contrary, coolly evaded it (112). 
In the web of souls, John realizes that he is the other; he does not belong to England. 
Despite that there is no communication in the form of conversation between him and 
the English crowd, in the stroll John has a sense of alienation through his silent 
contact with "thousands of souls" in the streets of London. When he first arrives in 
London, he stares at the English boldly but now he becomes less than an object which 
the English do not gaze at, but "evade". The position of gaze has changed. John used 




Both Boyhood and Youth are autobiographies of J. M. Coetzee, a male author. 
According to feminists, Boyhood and Youth are men's writing. However, the self in 
the two autobiographies is relational rather than autonomous. Neither the Gusdorfian 
model nor the feminist model is appropriate to analyze the self in Coetzee's 
^ autobiographies. If, according to feminists, Gusdorf built up a male discourse in 
autobiography criticism, feminists, nonetheless, strengthen such a discourse even 
though they present the idea of the female self as relational. 
As Charles Taylor points out, the "web of interlocution" governs the daily 
interaction of the self with the outside world. Feminists' polarized idea that the male 
self is autonomous whereas the female self is relational demonstrates inadequacy in 
analyzing the nature of self in autobiography. An example of women's life writing 
Among the White Moon Faces by Shirley Geok-Lin refutes feminists' idea of the 
female self as relational. In Lin's autobiography, the heroine's striving for a brilliant 
academic career as well as unlocking herself from conventional values imposed on 
Malaysian-Chinese women demonstrates a high degree of autonomy. The autonomous 
self in Among the White Moon Faces gives an example that the female self is not 
necessarily relational. 
Chang Jung's Wild Swans sets as another counter example to refute feminists' 
argument that the female self is relational. Chang's endurance and resoluteness in 
fleeing from Communist China to Britain via the academic path shows that the female 
self can be as autonomous as well as individualistic as the male self. In pursuing an 
academic career in Britain, Chang embarks on a path of autonomy in the form of 
profound solitude. Her curiosity about foreigners and the West isolates her from her 
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contemporary Communist members, but at the same time, enables her to depart from 
conventional chains of Chinese culture on women. The growth of her self requires a 
process of detachment from others. Opposite to feminists' theory on the self, the 
female protagonist's self is autonomous. 
The above examples are to point out that in investigating the self in 
autobiography, gender of the self should not be taken as the starting point. Scholars of 
autobiography should depart from the "axis of gender" (Eakin, 51). In discussing the 
� 
self in autobiography, the focus of analysis is the self but not the gender of the author. 
• Polarization presents a static view and a stereotype that the male self is autonomous 
whereas the female self is relational. The self, however, as Eakin goes, is "dynamic, 
changing and plural" (98)，regardless of gender. 
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